The Unspoken Institutional Battle over Anticorruption: \u3cem\u3eCitizens United\u3c/em\u3e, Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide by Eisler, Jacob
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 5
12-1-2010
The Unspoken Institutional Battle over
Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest Services,
and the Legislative-Judicial Divide
Jacob Eisler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle over Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9
First Amend. L. Rev. 363 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol9/iss2/5
THE UNSPOKEN INSTITUTIONAL BATTLE
OVER ANTICORRUPTION: CITIZENS UNITED,




INTRODUCTION .................................... ....... 365
PART ONE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS ....................... 368
I.TwO CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY ...................... 368
A. Competitive Democracy .......................... 369
B. Delibrative Democracy .......................... 372
II. Two CONCEPTIONS OF (ANTI)CORRUPTION ... ............ 373
A. Establishing the Terms of the Debate ................. 374
B. (Anti)Corruption in Delibrative Democracy: Examining
Reasons Directly ........................... ...... 376
C. (Anti)Corruption in Competitive Democracy: Procedure
Above All ................................ ..... 380
D. The Dirty Middle: Laws of Corruption in Practical
Application ............................... ..... 383
JD, Harvard Law School (2010), PhD Candidate, Harvard Department of
Government. Many thanks to Adriaan Lanni, Carol Steiker, Eric Nelson, Bob
Kagan, Jim Alt, Nancy Rosenblum, Eric Beerbohm, Michael Kang, Larry Lessig,
Dennis Thompson, Billy Magnuson, Will Selinger, and Bianca Lec for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Commentators and participants
at the Harvard Political Theory Workshop and the Harvard Public Law Workshop
provided invaluable feedback in response to presentations, especially Pritvi Datta,
Sabeel Rahman, and Yascha Mounk. An internship with the United States
Attorney's Office in Boston under Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ted Merritt and Tony
Fuller, in the auspices of a clinical led by Alex Whiting, provided invaluable
experience and insight. While the virtues of this paper may be attributable to others,
its views and mistakes are mine alone.
364 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 9
PART Two: CAMPAIGN FINANCE, HONEST SERVICES AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE ............................... 385
III. Campaign Finance: The Battle over Money in Elections ....... 386
A. Congress' Turn toward Delibrative Democracy: 1974
FECA ............................. ....... 388
B. Buckley: Laying the Foundation for a Competitive View of
Corruption ............................. ...... 393
C. Out of Buckley toward BCRA ..................... 399
D. A New Extreme in Competitive Retrenchment: Citizens
United ..................................... 405
IV.Official Corruption: The Battle over Honest Services ........... 409
A. The Battle over Honest Services: McNally, Skilling, and the
Latest Demise of 1341 .......................... 412
B. Trends in Corruption: Official Corruption before the Supreme
Court ...................................... 423
PART THREE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ..430
V. A Unified View of the Institutional Struggle .. ........... 430
A. The Generalized Picture: Balancing the Public and
the Private .................................. 430
B. Beyond Individual Rights: Systemic Explanations for the
Court's Position .......................... 434
i. Adversarial Procedure and Rights Protection ........ 435
ii. The Judicial Concept of Politics and the Priority of the
Individual ...................... ......... 437
iii. The Court Deliberative: Insitutional Self-Preservation and
Judicial Uniqueness ..................... 437
VI. Anticorruption in the Future: Political Implications and Directions
for Policy ............................ ..... 438
A. The Practice and Theory of Anticorruption ....... ...... 441
B. Policy Reform: Capitulation, Circumvention, or
Coercion .................................... 444
CONCLUSION .................................................. 447
Guided by a pair of decisions from 2010 (Citizens United and
Skilling), this article investigates a pivotal but overlooked dispute
between the Supreme Court and Congress over the acceptable contours
of public corruption law. Each case narrowly relies on principles and
2011] A STRUGGLE VISIBLE BUT UNSEEN
precedents that appear only tangentially related to corruption. Yet in
historical context, these cases emerge as only the latest judicial
nullification of broad and flexible congressional anticorruption
legislation. Through parallel examination of campaign finance
regulation and honest services law, this article suggests a subtle but
striking pattern: when Congress has advanced expansive, flexible
anticorruption measures, the Supreme Court has tenaciously constrained
such measures in favor of narrowly drawn bright-line rules.
This article argues that the disagreement originates in the
institutions' differing postures towards anticorruption. Certain
congressional action has promoted civic-minded public conduct and thus
facilitated "deliberative" examination of political motives. However, the
Supreme Court has generally blocked broadly constructed
anticorruption measures because their enforcement threatens
constitutionally protected individual rights. Thus, the Court has left
standing a "competitive" anticorruption regime which presumes a
market-like political setting populated by self-interested actors.
This unspoken divergence has shaped corruption law and with it
the nature of American politics. The Court's intractability poses a
dilemma for future anticorruption reform. Policy-makers must either
defer to the Court, but relinquish the possibility of deliberative
anticorruption achieved through traditional regulatory and prosecutorial
means, or force a reconsideration of individual rights in the context of
anticorruption enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
In the past year, the Supreme Court dramatically constrained
federal regulation of political corruption through two facially unrelated
decisions. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,' the Court
ruled that limits on corporate spending in federal elections are an
unconstitutional violation of the right to free speech. The decision further
eroded federal constraints on private financing of elections, an issue that
has generated extensive judicial debate since modem campaign finance
reform in the 1970s. In a trio of cases in June 2010 - Skilling v. United
1. 558 U. S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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States,2 Weyhrauch v. United States, and Black v. United StateS4 - the
Court hobbled federal anticorruption in a different context by limiting
prosecutorial discretion under the honest services provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346.' By indicating that a broad interpretation of the anticorruption
measure would raise vagueness and notice concerns, the Court obstructed
federal efforts to combat self-enriching conduct by public officials and
more generally mandated narrow construction of official corruption law.
Though at first blush these cases and their respective precedents
appear unrelated, parallel analysis of their histories reveals a striking
pattern: in both contexts, Congress has passed broad and flexible
measures to regulate what influences can permissibly enter the public
sphere and determine when government figures are tainted by private
interests. As epitomized by its most recent holdings, the Court has
curtailed these measures on the grounds that they infringe individual
rights (First Amendment rights with regards to campaign finance and due
process trial rights with regard to honest services). Consequently, the
Court has consistently frustrated certain forms of congressional
anticorruption resulting in a protracted institutional conflict.
This conflict, however, has not occurred as an explicit, open, or
unified debate. Neither the Court nor Congress has openly articulated a
theory (or even a comprehensive definition) of corrupt conduct, and the
narrow legal questions at play in the relevant cases often do not include a
direct inquiry into the nature of corruption. Yet, analysis of the disputed
law reveals that the two institutions have advanced differing types of
anticorruption enforcement (even if they have done so indirectly and
perhaps without deliberate intent). This article argues that, once
reconstructed, this conflict illuminates the path of modern corruption law
over the past forty years.
2. 561 U. S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
3. 561 U.S. ,1 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). This essay addresses public
corruption alone (excluding acts by private fiduciaries). While Wehyrauch alone
addressed misconduct by a public official, the Supreme Court issued a full opinion
only in the private-corruption case of Skilling and remanded Weyhrauch to be
reconsidered in light of Skilling. Id. Therefore Skilling and its implications for public
corruption are addressed in this article.
4. 561 U. S. , 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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Because of consistent thematic similarities in the discrete
disagreements, the conflict can be framed as a clash between differing
schools of anticorruption. This article organizes this divide through the
6distinction between competitive and deliberative democracy. In
focusing on the protection of individual rights from government
intrusion, the Court has adopted a competitive approach to corruption.
The competitive approach presumes that democratic practice is self-
interested and adversarial, with constituents unblinkingly focused on
their own particular political goals. Competitive democrats tend to prefer
an anticorruption regime that penalizes undesirable behavior through
narrowly delineated rules - not coincidentally, the type of regime less
likely to metastasize and invade individual rights. Conversely, Congress
has at times advanced "deliberative" anticorruption measures.
Deliberative democracy emphasizes discourse and cooperation, rather
than formal selection processes, as the core of healthy politics. Because
trust, empathy, and respect for other parties are prerequisites for
successful deliberative democracy, deliberative anticorruption inquires
into the actual motives underlying public conduct. Yet, the Court has
shown little toleration for deliberative anticorruption or interest in its
possible justifications. Thus the Court's rulings have established a
consistently and uncompromisingly competitive regime.
This article first develops a theoretical apparatus to analyze this
conflict; then compiles the evidence; and concludes with a theoretical
analysis and policy implications. Section I provides a brief synthetic
6. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 130-212
(2003) (describing two models of democracy). "Concept 1" bears some similarities
to deliberative democracy; "Concept 2" bears similarities to competitive democracy.
See id. at 130. Posner is ultimately critical of Concept 1, on the grounds that it is
"aspirational," whereas Concept 2 is laudably "realistic." Id. at 158. Posner's
descriptions do not map onto the categories in this paper precisely, and in particular
Concept 1 at times moves into caricature. See, e.g., id. at 131 (describing as a basic
premise of Concept I democracy that individuals should deliberate on what is "best
for society as a whole rather than on narrow self-interest"). Deliberative process may
pursue consensus, but more broadly, individuals must be willing to engage in
productive discourse about their interests, and recognize the legitimacy of others'
claims. For an alternative foundational conception of these two models, compare
Jilrgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS I
(1994) (describing "republican" and "liberal" models which correspond to Posner's
"Concept 1" and "Concept 2" respectively).
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description of the two conceptions of democracy. Section II proceeds to
describe differing views of the corruption each produces. Section III
uses these ideas to analyze the judicial and legislative debate on
campaign finance. Section IV does the same for honest services and
official corruption more broadly. Section V provides a comprehensive
analysis of the conflict, in particular why the Court's decisions have so
consistently had a competitive alignment. Section VI addresses the
broader effects of the conflict on politics and offers policy
recommendations.
PART ONE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
I. Two CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
This section summarizes a lively debate in democratic theory,
between those who believe properly functioning democracy is
characterized by competition between citizens, leaders, and interests
groups and those who believe healthy self-governance consists of shared
deliberation among members of a polity.'
7. Analyzing corruption through a binary competitive and civic-deliberative
axis is neither exclusive nor definitive. Rather, this article uses it as an instrumental
framework, stylized to aid perception of the conflict between courts and Congress.
For other frameworks for understanding corruption, see, e.g., MICHAEL JOHNSTON,
SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY (2005) (providing
four approaches based on a comparative analysis of different levels of political and
economic development by country, designed to complicate and add nuance to the
traditional quid pro quo bribery model); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 387-97 (2009) (describing different approaches
courts have used); Mark Philp, Defining Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 436,
440 (1997) (describing the three common definitions of corruption as "public office-
centred" (focused on behavior by leaders), "public interested-centred" (focused on
harm to public welfare), and "market centered" (abuse of public positions as
opportunities to maximize profit)).
8. Cf Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 31-32 (1985) (observing the tension between "republican" founders, who
thought politics should be centered around "[d]ialogue and discussion," and
pluralists, who saw politics as characterized by "conflict and compromise" between
interest groups fighting for scarce resources and who saw the notion of the common
good as "incoherent, potentially totalitarian, or both") (internal citations omitted)).
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A. Competitive Democracy
Competitive theorists define democracy as a structured conflict
between political actors. In a representative democracy, citizens express
their political preferences by electing leaders.9 Democracies must
possess sufficiently effective and impartial procedures by which the
electorate can make such selections.o Beyond any background structural
Sunstein's distinction has some ahistorical kinship to the competitive/deliberative
distinction, though pluralism need not correspond to idealized competitive theory.
Sunstein discusses a type of corruption, but it is fundamentally different from the
conception addressed in this essay: He defines corruption as the broader systemic
infiltration of special interests into government, not as particular acts of malfeasance.
Id. at 32, 39. This idea of corruption is related to that of institutional corruption. See
infra note 29.
9. Joseph Schumpeter provides the authoritative modem definition of
competitive democracy: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." JOSEPH SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (Unwin Paperbacks, 1987). He
analogizes individual voting to consumption, id. at 283, thus indicating his sympathy
toward the competitive idea of democracy as preference-satisfaction. Schumpeter's
view of politics may be overly pessimistic and focused on elite control - he
suggests that most individuals lack rationality or coherence in their political views,
id at 260-62, and that "the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a
stampede," id. at 283. Nevertheless he offers "the most influential power-centered
theory of government developed in the twentieth century . . . ." IAN SHAPIRO, THE
STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 51 (2003). More recent competitive-democratic
theorists are less dismissive of non-elite political participation. See, e.g., ROBERT
DAHL, PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-71 (2006) (defining democracy as a
competitive preference-realizing infrastructure); Adam Przeworski, Minimalist
Conception ofDemocracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY'S VALUE 23, 31 (lan Shapiro
& Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (describing the
relationship between Schumpeter's and Dahl's theories, and offering its own defense
of competitive democracy, drawing on the inevitably natural conflict between varied
interests). Cf RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 357-62 (offering an ultimately
critical assessment of competitive democracy even while observing it may include
discursive components).
10. See Habermas, supra note 6, at 6 ("According to the liberal [competitive]
view, the democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of compromises
between competing interests. Fairness is supposed to be granted by the general and
equal right to vote, the representative composition of parliamentary bodies, by
decision rules, and so on."); DAHL, supra note 9, at 125 (If the background
conditions for democracy are met, "then the election is the critical technique for
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constraints (often expressed through constitutional provisions)," which
preserve the fair character of competition, competitive democracy is
agnostic with regard to how individuals should make political decisions
or what outcomes are appropriate.
The function of politics in competitive democracy is to allocate
goods managed by the government; individuals' political conduct seeks
to realize their preferences in the distribution of these goods.12 Voters
and interest groups attempt to elect leaders who will advance policies
that they desire. Motivated by a desire to govern or the opportunity to
directly advance policies, candidates attempt to obtain votes in order to
win elections. Within the bounds of structural (constitutional)
constraints, successful elections produce outcomes that reflect the wishes
insuring that governmental leaders will be relatively responsive to non-leaders; other
techniques depend for their efficacy primarily upon the existence of elections and the
social prerequisites.").
11. Perhaps the most famous structural threat is the tyranny of the majority.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). The 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments guarantee a level of protection for a particular type of minority; it is
instructive of their weight that the most devastating conflict in American history was
fought at least in part over the institutionalization of this protection. But see
SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 11-21 (criticizing the traditional minority-protection
justification for constitutional and judicial restriction).
12. See DAHL, supra note 9, at 66 (taking the formation and existence of
preferences as a given). Cf ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY:
AUTONOMY vs. CONTROL 36-38 (1982) (describing the role played by autonomous
collective organizations in creating individual preferences and how these
organizations serve as vehicle in politics for such preferences). But see Cass
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692
(1984) (arguing that the Court's insistence on "reasonableness" effectively prohibits
government from exercising "raw political power" to transfer wealth on behalf of
interest groups). Sunstein's suggestion that the Constitution prohibits otherwise
unjustified purely competitive outcomes contrasts with the outcome of the
competitive implication of the Court's outcomes. Yet the Court's alignment can be
traced to its treatment of individual rights, and nothing suggests that the Court has
less interest in protecting the individual rights of political figures (or those who wish
to succor them). Thus, the reconciliation can be framed as such: a deliberative
anticorruption regime that holds public officials (and those who attempt to corrupt
them) to a special standard, requiring them to offer deliberative justifications for
their conduct. Yet to demand this special justification for the political context is to
take unique action against a set of political participants, which, according to
Sunstein, requires a unique justification. Id. at 1692-93.
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of the voting polity.' Since this view describes democracy as little more
than a selection rubric, many competitive theorists reject politics as a
forum for substantively shaping values and preferences.14
Competitive theorists suggest that properly structured opposition
promotes effective governance and protects individual rights. 5 When
leaders govern in the shadow of meaningful elections, they will treat the
electorate well; pervasive competition ensures that the state remains
responsive to the popular will. Perhaps more incisively, competition
encourages constituents to translate the popular will into political
outcomes. If citizens and interest groups must actively compete to
determine policy, they will defend their interest robustly and resist
domination - or simply being neglected - by other political groups or
leaders. Consequently, citizens are less likely to be dominated by either
direct oppression or subtle co-option. A competitive approach to politics
may also encourage citizens, perhaps recognizing the possibility of future
political defeat, to place certain rights and liberties beyond the reach of
electoral politics. 17
Because of its focus on power-based outcomes, competitive
democratic theory often has a minimalist or pessimistic character,
13. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 57-58, interprets Schumpeter, to describe this as
the democratic process of "leaders" being "disciplined by the demands of
competition."
14. See, e. g., id. at 21-34 (critiquing deliberative methods that seek to adapt
and reconcile citizens' political preferences through discourse).
15. Id. at 63 (observing that the competitive model both ensures "politicians
have incentives to be at least as responsive as their competitors to the demands of the
electorate" and that competition "is a valuable constraint on the corrupting effects of
power . . . shin[ing] light in dark corners, exposing corruption, and demanding that
governments be held to public account.").
16. See DAHL, supra note 9, at 133 (observing that democracies operate by
rule as minorities but minorities greatly extended in terms of "number, size, and
diversity"). Dahl proposes that the competition between minorities greatly interested
in political outcomes will ensure that no one is capable of dominating the political
sphere and will prevent tyranny of the majority or domination by the majority of an
unaccountable elite.
17. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 9, at 272 (suggesting that the competitive set-
up of elections will, on the whole, create the greatest amount of freedom for citizens,
citing as an example that competitive democracy will require "a considerable
amount of freedom for the press"). See also DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 358
(describing the role of free speech in the majoritarian democracy).
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particularly in rejecting the "common good."' 8 At their most aspirational,
competitive theorists suggest that democracy can ensure responsible
governance and protect liberties. If politics is ultimately about power,
democracy must channel and moderate that power in a responsible
manner. Competitive democrats argue this is best accomplished by
making the institutional conflict over governmental goods explicit,
unvarnished, and uncompromising.
B. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy appeals to tractable reason and human
sociability. Deliberative theorists suggest formal elections ought only
to be the denouement of a holistic political process. 20 Citizens advance
their claims by demonstrating their positions' reasonableness to other
members of the polity. For deliberative democrats, this journey of debate
and engagement may have greater importance than formal political
outcomes.
Discourse is the central tool by which constituents gain
understanding of their own and others' goals. 2 1 It increases participants'
understanding of the reasonableness and legitimacy of others' positions.
18. See SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 3. Unlike the deliberative approach, the
aggregative (competitive) approach does not take "a transformative view of human
beings." Id. Schumpeter is particularly harsh in his attack on the idea of the common
good. See also SCHUMPETER, supra note 9, at 251-52.
19. As used in this article, "deliberative democracy" draws from a range of
thinkers, not all of whom would necessarily be classified (or wish to be classified) as
deliberative democrats in the narrowly formal sense - in particular Sunstein and
Dworkin. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 72
(1993) ("considered judgments of a democratic polity" should have priority over
"consumer sovereignty"); DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 357, 364 (preferring
"partnership democracy" over "majoritarian democracy" in part because its richer
account of political life includes "democratic discourse").
20. DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 385 ("[S]elf-government means more than
equal suffrage and frequent elections. It means a partnership of equals, reasoning
together about the common good.").
21. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 3-56 (2004) (providing a seminal overview of deliberative democratic
theory).
[Vol. 9372
2011] A STRUGGLE VISIBLE BUT UNSEEN
22Ideally, discourse may reconcile diverse interests to reach consensus,
and even if it does not, citizens with opposing views gain greater mutual
understanding, enabling greater cooperation.23
Deliberative democrats require rich social engagement for
healthy politics, and theorists have proposed a variety of techniques to
facilitate deliberation.24 These techniques encourage citizens to reflect
upon the values and interests that shape their political preferences and to
empathetically engage with those who hold differing views. Thus, pre-
existing desires are only one contributor to citizens' final positions, as
this reasoning process modifies final preferences. This may lead to
outcomes better than any raw compromise that would result from tallying
pre-engagement preferences.25 Yet, rivaling the importance of better
policy outcomes is the opportunity for self-realization provided by
reflective political engagement. Deliberative process is not only a more
social and engagement-intensive process but seeks benefits that extend
beyond the resolution of political decision-making.
Despite its differences, deliberative democracy seeks many of
the same practical benefits as competitive democracy - rights protection
and responsiveness to the constituency. Robust deliberative engagement
promotes responsible government and reflecting on other citizens'
political standing protects rights and prevents abuses. In a healthy
deliberative democracy, citizens gain greater mutual respect and become
more politically involved, creating both a tighter community and stronger
22. G. A. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD
POLITY 17, 23 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) ( "[I]deal deliberation aims
to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus - to find reasons that are persuasive to
all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of
alternatives by equals.").
23. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 4 (the reason-giving emphasis
of deliberative democracy is "meant both to produce a justifiable decision and to
express the value of mutual respect").
24. See, e. g., Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in
DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds.,
2003); James Fishkin & Cynthia Farrar, Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to
Community Resource, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK 68-79 (John
Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005); Robert E. Goodin & John S. Dryzek,
Deliberative Impacts: the Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics, 94 POL. & Soc'Y
219(2006).
25. See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations
in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 5,25-29 (2001).
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links between citizens and elected leaders.2 These stronger relationships
in turn increase state accountability, renew citizens' involvement with
21politics, and generate a healthier, more inclusive political dynamic.
II. Two CONCEPTIONS OF (ANTI)CORRUPTION
Actual democracies will inevitably have both competitive and
deliberative qualities, though they can tend towards one alignment. One
aspect of this alignment is a regime's approach to identifying and
combating corrupt public behavior. Deliberative theory and competitive
theory each identifies different aspects of conduct as determinative of the
corrupt status of behavior, and each adopts characteristic anticorruption
measures that correspond to these respective aspects.
A. Establishing the Terms of the Debate
Many scholars have indicated that defining corruption poses
28
significant challenges, and a comprehensive account is beyond this
26. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 10-11 (describing main
benefits of deliberative democracy as "encourag[ing] public-spirited perspectives on
public issues" and the "promot[ion of] mutually respectful processes of decision-
making").
27. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 26 ("[In seeking to embody the ideal
deliberative procedure in institutions, we seek, inter alia, to design institutions that
focus political debate on the common good, that shape the identity and interests of
citizens in ways that contribute to an attachment to the common good, and that
provide the favourable conditions for the exercise of deliberative powers that are
required for autonomy."); Cf DAHL, supra note 9, at 131-33.
28. See John G. Peters & Susan Welch, Gradients of Corruption in
Perceptions of American Public Life, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS &
CONTEXTS 155-160 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2002). Some
commentators have observed that the necessary existence of particular political and
social norms undermine any universal definition of corruption. See, e.g., SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 91 (1999) (noting the problem
but indicating that even in cultures without clear distinctions between public and
private, there are "distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate behavior").
Others are even less optimistic about the possibility of a universal theory. See, e.g.,
John Gardiner, Defining Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS &
CONTEXTS 25 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2002) (observing
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article's scope. An underspecifying baseline definition that contains the
full range of plausibly corrupt behaviors is: an official's act is corrupt
when an official's motives for public action are excessively private-
regarding, and a private individual's act is corrupt when the citizen
attempts to incentivize an official to act in such an excessively private-
regarding manner.29 To be useful in theory or practice, this definition
must be further informed by foundational political and ethical norms.30
Most pressingly, these norms must identify motives that are excessively
private-serving. 3' Some systems demand total disregard of self-interest in
politics; others will permit some self-interest but constrain what types of
underlying definitional problems and possible divergence between legal definitions
of corruption and practices perceived as corrupt); Philp, supra note 7, at 457
(observing that a theory of corruption must be grounded in a foundational
understanding of "the ethical appeal of politics", of which there are several possible
interpretations).
29. Cf J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 417, 419 (1967) (offering a classic definition of
corruption as a violation of public duty for private gain); Samuel Issacharoff, On
Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 130 (2010) (identifying "the potential
private capture of the powers of the state" as the real nature of corruption, at least in
the electoral context). The definition used by this article excludes two types of
political occurrences. The first is broad decay or general non-agent-attributable
moral collapse of a state. This definition of corruption was prominent in early
modem political thought. See J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 204
(2003). For a contemporary account of corruption as decay, see generally Laura
Underkuffler, Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption In Law (Duke Law Sch.,
Working Papers in Public Law), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=2030&context--faculty scholarship. This definition of corruption also
excludes incompetence. An official behaves incompetently but not corruptly when
the motive is acceptable, but the subsequent practical policy is unacceptable. See
DENNIS THOMPSON, ETHics IN CONGRESS 17 (1995) (observing corruption may at
times be ultimately less harmful than incompetence and that some theorists have
observed that corrupt payoffs can induce usually ineffective or slothful public
figures to act). See also Philp, supra note 7, at 459.
30. See Philp, supra note 7, at 446 ("[W]e are forced to accept that to identify
political corruption we must make commitments to conceptions of the nature of the
political and the form of the public interest . . . definitional disputes about political
corruption are linked directly to arguments about the nature of the healthy or normal
condition of politics.").
31. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 2 (observing that self-interest lies
at the root of any corrupt act).
such interest are permissible.32 A related question is when actions qualify
as "public" - an act is politically corrupt only when it falls within an
actor's sphere of public duty. These questions of private motive and
public status are ultimately informed by a system's ethical framework, in
particular its theory of representative responsibility. On a less abstract
note, assessment of corrupt motives raises the evidentiary problem of
inferring mens rea. Evidentiary concerns can be especially difficult when
an official acts for unacceptable reasons (such as being bribed), but the
action itself, underlying motivation aside, appears to be a publicly
acceptable one; without public vetting or formal supervision, the corrupt
character of the act may never come to light.33 Establishing appropriate
standards for inferring corrupt intent requires striking a difficult balance.
Harsher standards identify more potential offenders, but may classify too
much behavior as presumptively corrupt.
Each of these questions is a rich topic for further study.
However, to demonstrate the institutional conflict in U.S. corruption law,
it is only necessary to observe that any anticorruption regime must
address them (directly or indirectly), and that competitive and
deliberative theories offer characteristically differentiated methods for
fighting corruption.
32. For example, an elected official who desires re-election may take an act
purely because it propitiates a group of voters necessary for his re-election (and does
not alienate any other particular group of voters); the elected official may not think
the act is inherently justified by public reasons, but takes it anyway. The act is
clearly self-interested, but a system that incorporates the idea of official-as-pure-
representative will not call it corrupt. However, if a public official takes the same act
because each member of the same group of voters will provide him with a dollar for
campaign finance purposes, some systems of campaign finance regulation would call
it corrupt. And if each voter provided him with a dollar for his unrestricted personal
use, virtually every healthy government would call it a criminal bribe.
33. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 56 (describing the difficulty of
detecting acts taken for corrupt reasons when the communication between official
and donor are covert or oblique); THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 108-09 (describing
the challenges posed by "mixed motives"); see also Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and
Development: A Review of Issues, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS &
CONTEXTS 321-22 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2002)
(discussing corruption in developing countries). For a discussion of the relevance of
the mens rea of corruption in the context of American jurisprudence, see Daniel
Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 784, 798-99 (1985).
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B. (Anti) Corruption in Deliberative Democracy: Examining Reasons
Directly
Deliberative anticorruption directly addresses whether or not the
mental states of public officials are sufficiently public-regarding. This
normatively straightforward approach follows from deliberative
democracy's emphasis of publically reasoned justification in political
decision-making. A legitimate political act must be able to survive
discursive examination by the polity; for the purposes of corruption, this
means the official must be able to reasonably argue the act is adequately
motivated by the public good. Actions that fail to satisfy this public-
regarding test are corrupt. 34 In actual discourse, this deviation consists of
a failure to participate in politics with good faith, misleading other
participants during deliberative engagement. When the official is a
delegate, and thus her discrete actions are not publicly debated, the
deviation consists of failure to consider if an act would survive such
deliberative consideration. Thus, when a public official willfully acts for
reasons that could not be justified through public deliberation, her
behavior is corrupt. 3 5 Since any motive that cannot be justified through
public reasoning is ultimately inspired by self-interest, an act that could
not pass muster before public reason-giving is unacceptably private,36
34. Such failures to engage in proper engagement may be systemic, occurring
when political institutions and cultural practices do not facilitate collective
deliberation. See THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 26-33 (the practices of institutional
corruption "so closely resemble practices that are an integral part of legitimate
political life that we are reluctant to criticize politicians who follow them").
Systemic/institutional corruption lies between clearly corrupt individual acts and the
diffuse decay classically associated with corruption.
35. See id at 20 (observing that the first principle of legislative ethics
mandates that "a member should act on reasons relevant to the merits of public
policies or reasons relevant to advancing a process that encourages acting on such
reasons").
36. See Teachout, supra note 7, at 373-74 (observing, to the congressional
founders, "political corruption referred to self-serving use of public power for
private ends . . . political corruption is a particular kind of conscious or reckless
abuse of the position of trust . .. political corruption is using public life for private
gain.") Teachout thus observes that the Founders' idea of corruption has a
deliberative streak - they were also concerned with promoting "civic virtue"
defined as a "orientation toward the public interest" and discouraging the use of
political power to advance special interests (whether personal - self-enrichment -
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even if it does not assume the traditional form of a bribe. In practice,
the influence of self-interest upon democratic political outcomes is
inevitable. Yet the perceptible role of self-interest must be discursively
defensible to other citizens (that is, an official could defend the self-
interest as politically legitimate) in light of the polity's norms and
expectations.
An ideal deliberative anticorruption regime would discursively
assess official action on a case-by-case basis. While this solution would
demand political behavior that is deeply and sincerely public-regarding;
it describes not law, but perpetual self-reflective politics. It is not
practical for anticorruption laws to replicate retrospective deliberative
democracy.3 8 Producing enforceable laws, while still accommodating
deliberative values, proves challenging. Procedurally good laws are
precise and crisp, define offenses clearly for the benefit of regulated
or political - the advancement of their districts at the cost of collective national
welfare). Id. at 374-75.
37. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 91-110 (distinguishing bribes
from patronage and gift giving based on cultural norms). If an official reflects upon
his reasons for acting and concludes his actions are publicly justified, his actions are
not corrupt. If the reasons for acting are in reality publicly justified, the official has
satisfied her duty and acted with integrity. If the reasons are not publicly justified but
the leader sincerely believes them to be, the official is incompetent in a subtle way
(he has a poor grasp of his polity's beliefs, or of dominant norms) but not corrupt.
Consider the distinction from incompetence, see THOMPSON supra note 29. If,
however, the official concludes that her action is not publicly justified, but acts
anyway for other reasons, those reasons must at some level be self-interested, at least
as a public-regarding motive. For example, an official who takes an action that
violates public duty because of the vicarious reward of watching a third party benefit
is still deemed to have acted corruptly. This does presume that every official: (1) is
aware of the obligation to act in a manner that could be justified and (2) self-reflects
before taking public action. An official who fails to satisfy these two presumptions
may be negligently corrupt; the official should be aware of the obligation to act in a
manner that accords with public reasons. Whether such negligent malfeasance of
public duty is corruption or mere incompetence is a technical question beyond this
article's ken, along with other difficult situations (for example, that of the official
who suffers from false consciousness and thus believes herself to be acting for
public reasons but, at a deep level, is motivated by self-interest).
38. The judicial system performs a very limited form of this review, see
discussion infra p. 408-09. However, because it is limited to questions of fact, it
cannot engage with the foundational normative questions regarding corruption.
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parties, and are easily applied in the courtroom.3 9 Conversely,
deliberative anticorruption is structured around constant debate over
political values and subtle motive inquiries, which are difficult practices
to neatly package in criminal or regulatory code.
In practice, deliberative anticorruption laws resolve this tension
by adopting measures that investigate public actors' relevant motivations
to the greatest degree feasible using regulatory and prosecutorial tools.
As a result of using measures with adaptability or breadth, 4 0 deliberative
anticorruption laws sweep or have the potential to sweep beyond
narrowly defined boundaries with a fluidity and sensitivity that mirrors
discursive reflection, and they have the capacity to focus upon and
potentially shape the general motivational state of actors. These two
traits - flexibility or breadth, and a focus upon motive as opposed to
sharply defined and easily identified bad behavior - grant such
anticorruption measures the holistic, expansive quality that is
characteristic of deliberative politics.
Deliberative anticorruption thus defines corruption by a specific
element of public conduct - motive - and creates legislation designed
to assess, regulate, or shape motives directly. These laws deploy a
conception of motive that extends beyond the narrow legal assessment of
mens rea. Instead, the laws broadly assess if the relevant mental states
provide an acceptable justification for the action. The goal is to create
measures that assay public conduct in light of public norms (in effect,
simulating discursive evaluation as best as possible). Because such an
assessment may be holistic and highly individualized, the laws that
instantiate it will often have a broader potential reach or fail to have
precisely delineated contours.
39. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On
the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010) (describing the
tension between the deliberative approach to democracy and the traditional view of
good, crisp laws by exploring the difference between rules and standards). The role
of this tension in driving the Court's anticorruption jurisprudence is described, infra
Section IV.
40. For an explanation of why competitive-style bright-line rules are
inadequate to achieve deliberative anticorruption, see Lowenstein, supra note 33, at
838-43 (describing the pluralist-competitive approach as adopting "rules of the
game" and describing the problems of treating these rules as fixed and adequate
rather than reflecting distinct substantive investments that may themselves be up for
debate).
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These anticorruption measures seek to guarantee a political
culture that is broadly civic-minded and guided by public expectations.
Evidentiary precision and bright preemptive delineation of the public-
private divide are de-emphasized in favor of ensuring that officials'
motives satisfy the standards of reasoned collective discourse; indeed,
the measures themselves aspire to simulate this discourse. However,
deliberative democracy itself does not entail substantive positions on
corruption, nor must laws with characteristics of a deliberative
anticorruption approach adopt specific positions on corruption. Rather,
deliberative anticorruption is distinguished by how it defines integrity in
politics: adherence to public standards of justifiability, as defined by the
ability to satisfy discursive assessment.
C. (Anti) Corruption in Competitive Democracy: Procedure above All
Competitive theory faces an initial conundrum in combating
corruption. Corruption is defined by normatively unacceptable motives,
yet norms and motives have no special weight in competitive democracy
- ethical norms and leaders' underlying motives are non-unique items
on the menu assessed by voter preference. Competitive democrats could
not a priori condemn constituents' support for a leader who had
egregiously self-serving motives if voters found she had other attributes
that made her, on the whole, desirable.4 1 Yet, as described in Section IA
of this article, the baseline requirement for competitive democracy is a
fair, formal procedure that establishes a legitimate selection process.
Competitive democracy cannot tolerate acts that violate this
framework,42 and competitive anticorruption subsequently condemns
actions that threaten it. Competitive anticorruption thus negotiates
41. The ideal competitive system would have no anticorruption laws. In this
system, all voters would have full knowledge of all acts and intentions of public
officials, perpetual and instantaneous recalls and elections would be feasible, and
there would be no transaction costs associated with elections. As a result, voters
could simply express any disapproval of leader conduct through political means. In
contrast, corruption laws in competitive systems can be explained by departures
from this ideal; elections are costly and necessarily involve a time lag, and
information is imperfectly provided and expensive to obtain.
42. See DAHL, supra note 9, at 132-33.
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between normative neutrality toward motives and protection of a
framework that has ultimately normative roots.
Competitive anticorruption is, in short, results-oriented. It wishes
to discourage public behavior that is clearly an abuse of power or office,
but it does not wish to make direct normative inquiries. To engage in
such normative inquiry would reach beyond the emphasis on procedure
and neutrality that characterizes competitive democracy. The resulting
anticorruption regime has a minimalist character.43 Competitive
anticorruption condemns specific behavior that transgresses clearly
established baseline values but avoids subtle normative assessments of
leaders' motives or probing the relationship between ethics and public
service. Consequently, competitive anticorruption tends to assume the
form of bright-line rules, which directly identify certain types of conduct
as unacceptable, prohibited, or illegal. The archetypal instantiation of
competitive anticorruption is the formulaic quid pro quo law, which
delineates the institutional framework with minimum reflection upon
ethical norms. Such laws offer a formula for identifying corrupt acts: 44a
public official performs a public act for a donor who, in exchange,
provides a private payoff to the public official.45 The status of each
component (when a payoff is private; when an act is public; when a
reason for a public act is sufficiently public-regarding; and when a
43. See generally Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance
Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111 (1995) (critiquing the "deliberative" and what he
calls, "moralist/idealist" approach to politics of Thompson and Lowenstein).
44. Competitive democrats may outlaw buying of citizens' votes, but this is the
simple recognition that citizenship itself is a type of public office and voting is a
type of public act. For a general overview of anti-vote-buying laws, see 18 U.S.C. §
597 (2006) (imposing criminal penalties for those who exchange their vote for
money); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment
protected candidate's later-retracted promises to reduce salaries and thus save
taxpayers' money); Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2000);
Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting
Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455 (1994). While raising interesting questions of
the nature of civic duty, this body of law is sufficiently distinct from other corruption
law to be omitted from this analysis.
45. Peters & Welch, supra note 28, at 157-60 (providing a more extensive
account with detailed breakdowns of each element of the offense). J. S. Nye,
Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 417, 419 (1967) (providing one of the early seminal accounts of corruption in
this form).
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transferred good qualifies as substantial or definite enough to be a
payoff) is crisply defined by law,46 and when they are linked together by
quid pro quo, the act is corrupt. Such formulas concretize the
framework's norms through bright-line tests. Did the official receive a
tangible private payoff? Did the donor receive a public act in return?
Does there appear to be a causal connection between the two (a
motivational inquiry much closer to traditional criminal treatments of
mens rea)? Corrupt behavior is cast as analogous to breach of contract to
govern responsibly, and the initially standard-like question that underlies
any corruption inquiry - has a leader acted in a manner that violates
obligations to the polity? - is reduced to a (relatively) crisp and precise
rule.47
46. The definitional challenge, see supra section IIA, is especially acute for the
quid pro quo formulas, as their efficacy depends upon accurate "coefficients" in the
equation. Unlike deliberative measures which can "punt" the definitional problem to
deliberation inherent in enforcement, competitive approaches must define the terms
crisply. For example, what is defined as a payoff? Does a guarantee of support in an
upcoming election count? Promise to look favorably upon a friend's child during an
upcoming interview? When is an act "sufficiently" public-regarding to be protected
from claims of corruption - if an act is inherently good for the public, but the
official also receives a pre-emptive (or ex post facto) gift, is the gift a bribe or
merely a tip? For an analysis observing that a field-wide consensus has emerged
regarding quid pro quo bribery, and simultaneously examining the inadequacies of
the consensus in light of comparative differences between cultures and nations, see
MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION 20-35 (2005). Cf ROSE-
ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 92-96 (observing the impact and limits of cultural
relativism). For an element-by-element analysis of American laws on corruption, see
Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 795-828 (examining corruption law in American state
and federal law as having five components - target of a public official, corrupt
intent, a benefit of value, a relationship to an official act, and an intent to influence
- and providing an analysis of each); Daniel H. Lowenstein, When is a Campaign
Contribution a Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127, 136-40 (William
C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2004) (analyzing the explicitness prong in
particular).
47. Narrow, brightly defined prophylactic conflict-of-interest statutes may be
explained in a like fashion. For example, a law prohibiting employment with a
company over whom an official has recently held regulatory power may be
necessary to prevent bribe-like conduct where the public act is provided prior to the
payoff, and the transaction is consummated tacitly. This topic touches on the
distinction between "bribes, gifts, prices, and tips." See RoSE-ACKERMAN, supra
note 28, 92-110 (providing a theoretical analysis); Lowenstein, supra note 33, at
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The competitive approach minimizes the need to directly address
the ambiguities of norms and motivation by codifying the relevant
inquiries. Of course, while it adopts constrained and crisp forms, the
competitive approach does not necessarily adopt a particular substantive
view regarding what particular acts are corrupt. A quid pro quo regime
may criminalize many behaviors and force disclosures of large amount of
information. Yet, the form does not suggest that this regime does more
than instantiate aggregate preferences regarding how leaders should act.
D. The Dirty Middle: Laws of Corruption in Practical Application
These accounts describe idealized anticorruption regimes. Actual
enforcement must blend the two approaches because in practice each
offers particular virtues. Competitive anticorruption measures define
offenses and requirements in concrete terms, offering greater
predictability and more transparent enforcement. However, this has both
practical and principled downsides. Because competitive anticorruption
is preemptively defined, it is less capable of reacting to innovatively or
48intricately corrupt acts. Competitive anticorruption also neglects
corruption's ethical underpinnings: leaders and officials are in positions
of public trust and responsibility, and corruption is unacceptable, in part,
because it contravenes this unique moral standing. Minimal formal
adherence to the sharply delineated laws may satisfy competitive theory,
but appears brittle as an ethical posture. Deliberative anticorruption does
not suffer from this problem; its measures look to deeper motivations and
can adaptively incorporate moral intuitions, so evasion of a narrow
formal prohibition will not shield an offensive act. Yet these virtues are
offset by a lack of precision and the possible need for enormous
discretion by enforcement agents - the very flaws competitive
enforcement generally solves.
796-97 (describing the distinction between bribes and an "unlawful gratuity offense
with bribery").
48. One notorious example of such a corruption-law failure is that of the recent
prosecution of Rod Blagojevich, which involved acts that were morally abhorrent to
many but only equivocally illegal. See Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Jurors Fault
Complexity of the Blagojevich Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at Al; Monica
Davey & Susan Saulny, For Blagojevich, A Guilty Verdict on 1 of 24 Counts, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at Al. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Many corruption laws integrate attributes of deliberative and
competitive anticorruption. For example, the most straightforward
federal anticorruption law, 18 U.S.C. § 201,'49 is a quid pro quo formula
- precisely defining officials, candidates, and official acts, and requiring
donors and payoffs to activate the statute - but includes broader
discretion in assessment of payoffs (defined as "anything of value") and
inserts the unglossed qualifier "corruptly" before "giv[ing]".o The
resulting measure has a generally competitive form but with interpretive
elements that introduce some deliberative flexibility. And prophylactic
statutes - those that prohibit conduct such as receipt of gifts by public
figures from interested parties, with no requirement of proof of influence
or actual quid pro quo - can serve either deliberative or competitive
values, based on their breadth. A narrow statute will have the
competitive qualities of an anti-bribery law, while a broader statute will
create a zone of mandated public-regardingness.
Finally, while I have scrupulously avoided correlating
approaches with substantive content, a correlation does exist between
regime affiliation and the content of corruption law. Content here refers
to the questions posed by the generic corruption model: what are bad
motives, what are the foundational norms and what is excessively
private-serving? A competitive system will generally condemn fewer
motives and self-interested actions, relying more heavily on elections to
promote acceptable behavior. Conversely, the deliberative approach will
tend to condemn a broader array of motives and permit less self-interest,
because any action must satisfy (hypothetical) critical consideration by
49. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
50. § 201(b)(1).
51. The spectrum-like nature of prophylactic statutes demonstrates that the
competitive and deliberative concepts of corruption define the same misconduct and
seek the same final good of political integrity. All theories and laws of corruption
merely attempt to define the extent of political obligation, to separate the public from
the private, and to describe permissible behavior in their intersection. In the
prophylactic statute context, this is demonstrated by the fact that both types of
statutes ultimately identify the behavior that is deemed presumptively unacceptable
for the polity (receipt of a good even without proof of a corresponding public act),
according to the relevant norms. A competitive view pushes this normative focus
into the background, whereas a deliberative approach embraces the broad sweep of a
prophylactic statute, treating them as part of a scheme to encourage good motives in
public officials.
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the polity. This contrast may be clearest in the assessment of vote-
seeking behavior. In competitive democracy, acts or promises by
candidates to gain votes is the very preference-driven engine of the
system. Conversely, for deliberative democrats, the belief, "I only take
this action because it will encourage a block of voters to elect me not
because I believe it publically beneficial," usually contravenes the
mutual respect and genuine other-regardingness that defines legitimate
politics.52 However, this parallel between democratic theory and
substantive content of anticorruption regimes is correlative rather than
causal. The competitive approach could indict such a wide array of acts
under quid pro quo and disclosure statutes as to virtually exclude self-
interest from officials' political conduct. Likewise, upon deliberation, a
polity (or its delegates) might conclude that only the most egregious
abuses of public power for private gain are corrupt. As with the forms of
laws, in practice a polity will have an intermediate position on
substantive corruption. For this article, these ideal substantive positions
are primarily helpful in that they can serve as guideposts to the form-
oriented analysis of the institutional conflict.
PART Two: CAMPAIGN FINANCE, HONEST SERVICES, AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE
Examining modem anticorruption law through the competitive-
deliberative divide reveals a remarkable episodic conflict between the
Supreme Court and Congress. Both lines of cases (campaign finance
reform and honest services) reflect a consistent pattern: Congress passed
deliberative anticorruption law, only to watch the Court nullify them by
either narrow interpretation or outright rejection. Consequently, the
Court has served as the unspoken (and perhaps inadvertent) champion of
a competitive response to corruption.
The conflict has manifested on two levels. When the Court has
examined anticorruption legislation, its holdings have pruned back
deliberative anticorruption while leaving intact competitive
52. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 32 (suggesting that the Madisonian
conception of democracy rejects the competitive position and defining corruption as
acting only to satisfy interest groups, including, presumably, enough interest groups
to ensure reelection).
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anticorruption measures. In the campaign finance context, when
Congress has regulated certain types of campaign spending, the Court
has responded by holding that such limitations violate the First
Amendment. In the honest services context, the Court has held that
broadly defined anticorruption laws, which grant substantial discretion to
prosecutors, violate due process, and indicated that only quid pro quo
prohibitions satisfy vagueness and notice requirements. Thus, on its face,
the conflict has occurred indirectly, as the Court has found constitutional
infirmities in most deliberative anticorruption schemes, rather than made
specific statements regarding corruption. However, the Court's
statements on corruption - which comprise a penumbra of dicta around
its holdings - suggest it views politics as a market populated by self-
interested actors. The Court has been dubious of congressional efforts to
challenge this conception.
A final caveat before plunging into the evidence: neither
institution has treated anticorruption law as a coherent whole or
articulated a general theory of corruption. Congressional legislation has
accumulated piecemeal, often in response to external political pressures.
The Court's immediate objections to such legislation have been framed
in terms of individual rights. The subsequent two sections must piece
together the deliberative-competitive divide through examination of the
legislative and judicial responses themselves. Moreover, neither the
Court nor Congress has comprehensively or consistently defined corrupt
action or framed the conflict in unified terms. Thus, this article
definitively concludes only that the divide over anticorruption exists, but
it does not suggest that either institution has intentionally advanced or
consciously holds a coherent theory on corruption.
III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE BATTLE OVER MONEY IN ELECTIONS
Campaign finance has been the most active forum for debating
anticorruption in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court has
generally struck down congressional efforts to deliberatively restrict the
influence of private money (and thus private motivational influence). The
campaign finance literature is well-trod, 3 so this section focuses on the
53. Campaign finance reform has been a darling of the academy, though
corruption has received proportionally little attention. The latter reality is curious
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given anticorruption was modem campaign finance reform's original inspiration.
The debate has instead focused on the tension between free speech versus equality of
political participation. The 'free speech' wing, led on the Court by Scalia and
Thomas, has argued that campaign finance reform unconstitutionally, and
perniciously, restricts the right to political speech. See Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. , , 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[a] documentary film critical of a potential Presidential
candidate is core political speech" and thus protected by the First Amendment even
if it is created by a corporation); id at _, 130 S. Ct. at 980 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing that a campaign finance reform provision
violated the First Amendment and noting that "[p]olitical speech is entitled to robust
protection under the First Amendment"). For the argument that the broadest possible
treatment of First Amendment and minimal finance regulation enhance democratic
governance, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1089 (1996)
(federal and state finance regulation have not only failed to achieve the
anticorruption and pro-egalitarian goals of reform, "but . . . have themselves had
undemocratic consequences for the electoral system"). See also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U. C. DAVIS L. REV, 663, 672-
75 (1997) (arguing that political expenditures may enhance the democratic process).
Others have argued that less regulation permits for a broader range of ideas by
giving challengers a means to counteract the incumbent advantage. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel: The Constitutional Morass of Campaign
Finance, in PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, 183, 190 (K. D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff eds., 2006) (describing
as "essentially unanswered" by the Court Scalia's observation that the McCain-
Feingold Act restricts soft money while increasing hard money limits, yet that hard
money is the type easier for incumbents to raise. The inference is thus that Congress
might be engaging in legislative self-dealing.). See also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230, 248-49 (2006) ("[C]ontribution limits that are too low also can harm the
electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns
against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.").
Conversely, the "equality" wing, represented on the Court by Breyer and (until
recently) Stevens, suggests that unchecked campaign spending damages political
equality by allowing wealth to determine political outcomes. See, e.g., Burt
Neuborne, Money and American Democracy, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA, 37,
42-43 (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006) (arguing current campaign
spending practices, validated by Buckley, leave a vast percentage of the population
politically unequal); id at 48 (observing, "[vlirtually every other serious democracy
subsidizes the campaign process, assuring that the rich do not exercise
disproportionate political influence"); Spencer Overton, The Donor Class:
Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 77 (2004)
(arguing that even after the McCain-Feingold Act, "[m]assive disparities in the
distribution of wealth cause disparities in political participation"); Frank Askin,
Political Money and Freedom ofSpeech: Kathleen Sullivan's Seven Deadly Sins - an
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points most relevant to the institutional divide: the original judicial
gutting of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act amendments' 54
deliberative measures in Buckley v. Valeo", and the recent interdiction of
Congress's much more modest deliberative efforts in the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act5 6 through Wisconsin Right to Life57 and Citizens
United.5 1
A. Congress's Turn toward Deliberative Democracy: 1974 FECA
Campaign finance regulation began to assume its current
character following Watergate.59  The scandal demonstrated that
Antitoxin, 31 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1065, 1077-80 (1998) (observing the plutocratic
effects of current campaign finance laws and the incompatibility of this system with
constitutional values). For a defense of public financing of campaigns, see, e.g.,
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994)
(arguing that publically financed campaigns are superior in terms of the
constitutional idea of equal access to politics, and in preventing quid pro quo
conduct or related behavior); Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The
Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected
Officials, 37 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 669 (2006) (arguing campaign spending limits will
result in both fairer elections and better governance, as leaders will be less concerned
with fundraising). For a more general account supporting the equality wing, see
OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 79 (1996) (differentiating between
"libertarian" and "democratic" treatment of the First Amendment). Cf SUNSTEIN,
supra note 19. See generally supra Section 1.
54. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (Supp. 2002)). 1974 FECA amended the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
55. 424 U. S. 1 (1976).
56. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C. (2002)).
57. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
58. 558 U. S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
59. Cf George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us - Salinas, Sun-
Diamond, and Two Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747 (2000)
(describing Watergate as an anticorruption threshold). Brown argues immediately
after Watergate there was a pervasive "hard-line" approach to corruption, which has
been followed by an accelerating "counterrevolutionary critique." See id. at 751-64.
Brown claims the Court's conduct reflects this pattern. Claiming its initial decisions
are strongly anticorruption but gradually it has adopted a more lenient stance. See id.
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disclosure requirements alone would not adequately ensure ethical
60
campaign practices. Congress responded with its first attempt to
comprehensively regulate campaign spending. It established the Federal
Election Commission; created monitoring and reporting mechanisms for
most expenditures; placed strict limits on contributions by individuals,
parties, and political action groups; limited candidates' expenditures,
whether funded by outside contributions or their own wealth; limited
"independent expenditures" by private individuals in support of
6 1candidates; and established a network of public funding (matching
62funds for primaries and general funds for general elections). The goal
was ambitious: to provide "complete control over and disclosure of
campaign contributions and expenditures in campaigns for Federal
elective office"; 63 Congress indicated that "[t]he election of federal
officials is not a private affair." 6 The goals of FECA were twofold:
ensuring any viable candidate could communicate with the electorate and
preventing corruption by discouraging excessive candidate reliance on a
61
small pool of donors.
at 811-12. Conversely, this article suggests the Court has maintained a consistent
competitive approach to corruption.
60. See S. REP. No. 93-689, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5587, 5588. See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 YALE. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1976) (stating that "Congress passed these
provisions in response to political abuses which culminated in the 1972 presidential
campaign and its aftermath . . . .").
61. For recognition of the constitutional issues raised by this measure, see S.
REP. No. 93-689, at 18-19 (1974).
62. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §101(b), 88
Stat. 1263, 1263-64 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (Supp.
2004)), describes contribution limits; § 101(c) describes expenditure limits; and key
terminology for contribution and expenditure limits are articulated by §§ 201, 204-
309.
63. S. REP. No. 93-689, at 1.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id ("The only way in which Congress can eliminate reliance on large
private contributions and still ensure adequate presentation to the electorate of
opposing viewpoints of competing candidates is through comprehensive public
financing.") (emphasis in original). Both goals are emphasized throughout the
introductory text as motivations for the regulations. Current circumstances make it
"exceedingly difficult to finance an adequate campaign to carry ... [candidates']
message[s] to the voters." Id. The Report also speaks of the need to "purify" the
campaigns, id at 6, and ensure, by encouraging small contributions by many donors
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The 1974 FECA recognized that democratic decision-making
involves a competitive selection process but sought to make the
contextual political culture as deliberative as possible. It facilitated
competitive elections, particularly by providing the electorate with
66information. Yet, the bill also strove to make elections more robustly
public affairs by "encourag[ing] a candidate to involve large numbers of
voters in the fundraising process" 6 and ensuring citizen participation in
politics. The goal was elections imbued with the hallmarks of
deliberative democracy: citizen involvement, meaningful discourse, and
engagement between polity and leaders.69
The central measures of 1974 FECA can be classified as
reflecting competitive or deliberative anticorruption concerns. The direct
limitations on contributions to candidates and functionally equivalent
independent expenditures on their behalf 0 were the most explicitly
competitive measures. Their purpose was to prevent "undue influence by
a group or individual." 7 1 In effect, they were anti-bribery measures in the
campaign finance context. By treating such payments to or on behalf of
politicians as unacceptable payoffs, these limitations prohibited a quid
in a party context, that any private funding "represents the involvement of many
voters and not merely the influence of a wealthy few" id at 8.
66. See id. at 5 (defining the legislation's purpose as protecting "the whole
process of political competition"); id. at 6 (describing the goal of permitting
candidates "to run a fully informative and effective campaign").
67. Id. at 7.
68. This is particularly salient with regards to the role of parties described in,
id at 7-9. For a description of how party competition can contribute to a deliberative
approach to democracy, see NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS 306-
11(2008).
69. See Senator Pell's comment, S. REP. No. 93-689, at 89 (suggesting that the
goal of the bill is to "return[] to our people, to our individual voters a rightful share
and a rightful responsibility in the choosing of their candidates. And it can serve to
establish that climate of public trust in elected officials which this country so
earnestly desires").
70. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 101(a)-
101(f)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-65 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55
(Supp. 2002)) (limiting amount of contributions to political figures and criminalizing
honorariums paid to elected officials).
71. S. REP. No. 93-689, at 19. See also id. at 5 (suggesting the desirability of
emancipating candidates from dependence "on those relatively few individuals
capable of contributing the maximum amount permitted by law"); supra note 68.
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pro quo through campaign donations. Operating on the contestable
descriptive premise that excessive aid to a candidate could potentially
sway the candidate in the donor's favor, these prohibitions manifested a
straightforward political principle: democratic political outcomes ought
not to be overdetermined by the private deployment of personal wealth.
By evoking this principle - which underlies any regulation of quid pro
quo bribery - Congress avoided investigation of motivational subtleties
in this facet of the regulatory framework.
Conversely, the expenditure limitations72 directly evaluated the
legitimacy of certain political motives. The expenditure limitations
discouraged candidates from approaching campaigns as private
undertakings, and, as such, were an attempt to shape political motives.
Rather, the limitations induced candidates to treat their campaigns as a
public process. The motivational aspects of this are subtle - candidates
were discouraged from privately structured self-aggrandizement and
instead encouraged to participate in broader public engagement.
Congress' interests in shaping candidate motivation may have been more
apparent in the positive element supporting the expenditure limitations,
the public financing regime. In constructing it, Congress expressed a
desire to make candidates more broadly public - rather than private-
regarding" and to engage the citizenry as a whole, rather than propitiate
74
the individuals who offer the most funding. These measures are typical
of overbroad deliberative anticorruption protections which discourages
overly self-serving conduct by political actors.
Ultimately, the two classes of measures complemented each
other: narrower competitive measures sought to improve the translation
of constituent preference into government action, while deliberative
provisions attempted to infuse the selection process with a sense of
collective engagement. Additionally, some elements of 1974 FECA were
72. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88
Stat. 1263, 1263-68 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (Supp. 2002)).
73. S. REP. No. 93-689, at 5 (describing the need "to pay for the public
business of elections with public funds") (citation omitted); id. (observing that
elections are not "private affair[s]").
74. Id. at 6 (describing a major goal of matching public financing as
encouraging candidates to rely mainly on "grass roots" for fundraising); id. at 7
(describing the use of matching limits to "encourage[] a candidate to involve large
numbers of voters in the fundraising process").
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justified on both deliberative and competitive grounds, such as
streamlined disclosure requirements. 5
Some have offered an alternative interpretation of FECA,
suggesting campaign finance reform must, by structural necessity, be
dedicated to the elimination or mitigation of the effect of wealth
76disparities upon elections. This argument suggests Congress addressed
75. §§ 201-318, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263, 1265 (summary of the changes); see also
S. REP. No. 93-689, at 15-16. These changes can be explained by both the desire to
improve voter accuracy and expose speculative quid pro quo to public scrutiny, but
also by the desire to facilitate public debate and encourage general awareness of
public norms in acceptance of campaign contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S., 1, 68 (1976) ("[Dlisclosure requirements - certainly in most applications -
appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance
and corruption. . . ."); id. at 83 ("[D]isclosure serves informational functions, as well
as the prevention of corruption .... ).
76. The "equality" wing holds elimination of the effect of wealth disparities on
elections to be a valid goal of campaign finance reform. See supra note 53. A strand
in the campaign finance literature, moreover, has argued that campaign finance
reform must never be targeting corruption in a simple form. See, e.g., David A.
Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1369 (1994). Strauss claims that campaign finance regulation is, at its root, never
about corruption. Id. at 1373. He explains:
The conventional form of corruption occurs when elected
officials take advantage of their position to enrich themselves. In
effect they convert their public office into private wealth. But
when the quid pro quo for an official action is not a bribe but a
campaign contribution, the official has used the power of her
office, not for personal enrichment, but in order to remain in
office longer.
Id. Strauss thus suggests the problem facing campaign contributions is not
corruption of leaders, but the effect of inequality upon candidate conduct. Campaign
contributions just manifest a broader problem of ensuring leaders' accountability;
electoral pressure applied by other forms of citizen action can distort the impact of
individual vote as much as a campaign contributions. Strauss' insight presumes a
competitive view of politics as a simple vote-market. From a competitive view all
corruption can be traced to inequality; if all individuals had equal resources and
political markets were efficient, then there would be no corruption, merely accurate
expression of desired political outcomes through both votes and financial
expenditures.
Similar arguments are developed by Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1723-24 (1999)
(arguing that since campaign finance funds are ultimately directed towards voters
through expenditures, the real issue must be corruption of voters, and that this raises
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two possible effects of wealth in politics. The use of wealth by the rich
might unfairly reduce the relative political power of the poor, and the
disproportionate power of wealthy candidates might preemptively bias
candidates towards taking positions appealing to rich (prospective)
donors. Some have argued Congress' efforts addressed these political
imbalances, rather than fought corruption. However, the history and
context of the 1974 FECA demonstrates that this critique is inaccurate, at
least as of an assessment of institutional intent. 77 As the legislative
history confirms, the measures were primarily directed toward
politicians, not toward constituents. Increased equality in political
influence may have been a benefit of the FECA regime because it
required candidates to achieve widespread popular support rather than
rely on a few wealthy donors. Yet, this will generally be true of any
anticorruption enhancement because it will reduce opportunities to
convert wealth into political action.
B. Buckley: Laying the Foundation for a Competitive View of Corruption
This mixed campaign finance regime did not survive judicial
78
review. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court left intact 1974 FECA's
significant theoretical difficulties for both competitive ("pluralist-protective") and
deliberative ("republican-communitarian") democrats, since defending campaign
finance in either view suggests voters' interests or reasoning processes can be
distorted by candidate spending). See also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox
of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 903 (1998) (arguing that
campaign spending is really only a concern if it is presumed most voters are "civic
slackers" who are disengaged from political reasoning). These authors ultimately
attempt to reason away the possibility of campaign finance contributions corrupting
leaders, instead suggesting campaign finance reform must be an effort to
deliberatively reform voters. This view, insightful as it is, does not give sufficient
shrift to the alternate deliberative desire that leaders should be genuinely public-
minded, as opposed to voracious vote-obtainers. Cf Molly J. Wilson, Behavioral
Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 740-41 (2010) (arguing "the relationship
between money and potentially manipulative communication strategies arguably
supports a more expansive definition of 'corruption') (internal citations and
quotations omitted omitted).
77. This article remains agnostic regarding the critics of campaign finance
reform as anticorruption mentioned in the previous footnote.
78. 424 U.S. 1.
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competitive measures while striking down or emasculating most of the
deliberative ones. The Court balanced the governmental interest7 in
anticorruption against First Amendment rights and concluded that,
provisions that limited contributions to candidates or parties were lawful,
while those that limited expenditures (of candidates, parties, or, with a
particular limitation, independent advocates) were not. Moreover, the
Court's analysis reflected the presumption that competitive corruption is
the only valid type, though it never clearly articulated the theoretical
foundations of this position.
Measure by measure analysis reveals the Court's competitive
bent. The Court held limits on direct contributions to candidates lawful,
on the grounds that such contributions could be traded by donors in
exchange for political favors by, or greater influence over, candidates. 8 2
By preventing such trades, these measures deterred corruption or the
appearance of corruption.83 Moreover, the Court held such limitations
did not significantly restrict the individual First Amendment right to
association, as a small contribution showed one's political allegiance
79. The Court's classification of anticorruption as a governmental interest is
itself theoretically substantive. Certainly, the regulation is state action, so in a formal
legalistic sense clearly citizen rights are being balanced against government action.
However, the relationship between anticorruption and representation is more
ambiguous. Insofar as anticorruption seeks to ensure accurate and just translation of
constituents' wills into governmental action, anticorruption might be described as a
popular interest, rather than a narrow governmental one. In this vein, some have
argued that anticorruption should be given constitutional weight on the basis of an
accurate originalist reading. See Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 Ky. L.J. 75, 83-86 (2003) (arguing
for an "Anti-Corruption Legacy" in the Constitution that addresses federalism
concerns); James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design
of Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REv. 87, 122-23 (2000) (arguing that the founders
hoped to create a state based in "virtuous" concern of public affairs rather than "self-
interest"); Teachout, supra note 7, at 387-97 (discussing various Justices' views of
corruption and how contemporary definitions of corruption differ from that of the
Framers').
80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-45 (resolving the line between "express" and
"issue" advocacy using a "magic words" approach and thereby differentiating
between independent advocacy and de facto contributions).
8 1. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id. at 25-30.
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with the same symbolic heft as a large one.84 The Court held, however,
that expenditure restrictions did not directly address corruption and
substantially restricted both speech (since much communication requires
money) and association (since impairing speech harms associations
85dedicated to political advocacy). Thus, in the Court's view the more
effective measure also did less harm: contribution limits were the better
anticorruption tools and infringed less upon First Amendment rights.
The opinion balanced government interests against the burden
upon constitutionally protected rights. The Court's positive focus
ensured no government action unjustifiably harmed the rights of speech
or association. As such, the Court was not independently concerned with
anticorruption, but rather with ensuring Congress' own anticorruption
efforts did not have untoward ancillary effects. Yet in weighing the
anticorruption efficacy of the government's measures, the Court
deployed a narrowly competitive concept of corruption.
[T]he primary interest served by the limitations and,
indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by
the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial
contributions on candidates' positions and on their
actions if elected to office . . . . To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined.87
With its sole concern for prohibiting quid pro quo, this was a
classically competitive formulation of corruption.88 The Court also
recognized that the appearance of corrupt acts may pose risks:
84. Id at 22.
85. Id at 45, 51-52, 58-59. The Court also summarily rejected the argument
that expenditure of money is not speech and thus outside the ken of First
Amendment protection. Id. at 16.
86. Id. at 47-49. See SUNSTEIN, supra note t9, at 94-95.
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27. See also id at 53 ("The primary governmental
interest served by the Act [is] the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the
political process", thus implying that corruption of the political process is
coextensive with the prevention of quid pro quo corruption of individual
candidates.).
88. Id. at 27-28. The Court notes that:
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Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions . . . . Congress could
legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence is also critical . . . . if
confidence in the system of representative Government
is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. 89
This demonstrated awareness of the evidentiary difficulties of
monitoring corruptiono and the subsequent impact inadequate
enforcement can have on popular trust in politics. Yet quid pro quo was
the only form of "improper influence" the Court recognized as possibly
having this trust-eroding effect; the risk that citizens believe their leaders
are being corrupted was identified with the risk citizens believe their
leaders are being bribed. 91 Thus, the Court's consideration of the
appearance of corruption reinforced its commitment to competitive
corruption.
laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those
with money to influence governmental action . . . .
Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure
was only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings
were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the
reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system
permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when
the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.
Id. Thus, the Court observes that bribery laws may not adequately capture or monitor
all corrupt exchanges (at least in the election context), simply because there may be
difficulties in adequately proving and defining the terms of the corrupt exchange;
corruption still consists of illicit public-private exchanges. This concern with
defining terms for bribery formulas is characteristic of quid pro quo competitive
corruption. See also Brown, supra note 59, at 803 (recognizing that the Court
condemns corrupt behavior based on its "perception of how close it is to bribery").
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Civ. Serv.
Comm'n v. Nat'l Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
90. See id. at 27 ("[T]he scope of such pernicious practices can never be
reliably ascertained . . . .").
91. See id. at 26-27.
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As demonstrated in Section WA of this article, Congress wished
to establish an electoral culture that condemned excessively self-
interested political conduct. Consequently, types of behavior Congress
sought to discourage as corrupt included not only the most explicit quid
pro quo violations, but also broadly self-interested behavior. Yet the
Court demonstrated no concern for Congress' desire to promote
deliberative practices, nor acknowledged that Congress' deliberative
measures targeted illicit behavior of a form other than quid pro quo.
Rather, when condemning the anticorruption efficacy of expenditure
restrictions, the Court inquired solely whether a measure deterred quid
pro quo.92 This excluded Congress's deliberative concerns from
incorporation into the assessment of anticorruption practices, and thus
from the balancing against First Amendment rights that determined if
measures passed constitutional muster. In short, the Court's own
conceptualization of corruption preemptively ensured only competitive
measures would survive constitutional assessment. The Court's narrow
competitive allegiance is further apparent when it preemptively declared
that efforts to equalize the relative ability of voters to express themselves
do not have constitutional weight.93 According to deliberative theory,
public engagement benefits greatly when members of a polity interact as
equals, and hints of this are apparent in the 1974 FECA design.9 4
92. Id. at 45-47 (addressing independent expenditures restrictions, with
references to "buy[ing] influence" and "alleviat[ing] the danger that expenditures
will be given as quid pro quo"); id at 52-53 (addressing personal expenditures, and
concluding that use of personal expenditures is actually a good way to avoid
corruption; this is clearly antideliberative given the potential for self-promotion in
sheer reliance on personal wealth); id. at 56-57 (discussing general limits on
campaign spending).
93. Id. at 17 (declaring as a core principle that equalizing cannot be a valid
justification).
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.
Id. at 48-49 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
94. S. REP. No. 93-689, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587,
5594 (describing the goal of "the involvement of many voters and not merely the
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Equalizing measures are one facet of the deliberative effort to reduce
corrupt motivations, by limiting opportunities for aggressive self-
aggrandizement and thus encouraging publicly-oriented engagement. 9 5
Yet the Court refuses to acknowledge this possible justification for
advancing expressive equality.
Of course, the Court need not have concluded that FECA's
expenditure provisions do pass constitutional muster; it is a separate
substantive question if their benefits justify the harm to protected rights.
Yet the Court never even acknowledged that Congress is, through these
measures, addressing practices and political deviations that might be
deemed corrupt. The Court declared that only fighting quid pro quo
corruption, and that alone, can satisfy the anticorruption "compelling
government interest" bar.96 In light of the Court's initial statement that
anticorruption alone could possibly balance the infringement of
constitutional rights, deliberative anticorruption measures that run afoul
of constitutional rights will never survive. Since meaningful
anticorruption reform will almost necessarily regulate political conduct
that receives some level of constitutional protection, this virtually
guarantees a competitive electoral anticorruption regime.
Of course, it might be argued that the Court did substantively
endorse deliberative democracy, and that its decisions were motivated by
a desire to sustain the deliberative mainstays of "political debate and
discussion." 9 7 However, as with corruption, the Court's theory of
discourse was founded in competitive democracy. The Court perceived
debate and discussion to be facilitated by a greater volume of speech
with minimal government intervention.98 In the Court's view, the
influence of a wealthy few" in politics and campaign finance); id. at 6, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5592 (describing the value of "grass roots" campaign
finance).
95. Cf Strauss, supra note 76 (discussing David A. Strauss' view on the effect
of inequality on elections).
96. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
97. Id. at 58; see also id. at 48-49 (describing the need to protect "unfettered
interchange of ideas") (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266,
269 (1964).
98. See id. at 19.
[T]he First Amendment right to speak ones mind .. . on all public
institutions includes the right to engage in vigorous advocacy no
less than abstract discussion. Advocacy of the election or defeat
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electoral process operates best as a libertarian free market; Buckley rests
on the premise that the only reason for interfering with this dynamic is
the prospective quid pro quo corruption of legislators, or suspicion
thereof. Yet Congress intended to advance a foundationally different
electoral ethos - one premised around elections with a public rather
than private character - with the ensuing consequences for political
speech and preference formation.99 By judging democratic practices
through free-market principles and treating voters as raw information-
obtaining, preference-fulfilling consumers, the Court excluded
deliberative values from consideration.
The practical effect of the Court's decision was to
institutionalize the contribution/expenditure divide, a policy that still
stands. 100 It left the competitive measures intact and the deliberative
measures either overruled or ineffective; with the expenditure restrictions
gone, the public financing regime was rendered ineffective.' 0
Moreover, the Court's analytic framework suggested it would continue to
enforce this dichotomy so long as its current principles remained in place
- a prediction borne out in Citizens United.
of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection
under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy
generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.
Id. at 48 (internal citations and quotation omitted).
99. Some commentators (predictably from the equality wing) have criticized
Buckley's marketized conception of political discourse. See DWORKIN, supra note 9,
at 362 (observing that Buckley operates in the majoritarian conception of
democracy). Cf STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 46-49 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
2005) (suggesting that free speech in the campaign context is better conceived of as
"a conversation" rather than simple non-obstruction, but ultimately lauding the
Court's decision in Buckley for respecting this balance). Others have suggested
Buckley respected deliberative ends. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 94-101.
100. Interestingly, the Court also struck down Congress' construction of the
FEC as a nonpartisan/bipartisan anticorruption enforcement body. Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 120. This decision - based on the appointments clause - is not directly relevant
to corruption law, but suggests formalist interpretations of the Constitution
contribute to the Court-Congress conflict over corruption.
101. See id. at 86. See generally Askin, supra note 53 (describing how absence
of regulation renders public financing ineffective).
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C. Out of Buckley towards BCRA
In the three decades following Buckley, the Court handed down a
number of decisions that merely shifted the margins of campaign finance
regulation, even as the status quo endured harsh criticism from
commentators102 and within the Court. o3 Generally speaking, these
decisions elaborated on three doctrinal issues: when money deployed by
outside parties comprised a non-coordinated independent expenditure as
opposed to a coordinated de facto contribution;' when to treat political
speech by independent parties as direct advocacy for a candidate, and
thus face treatment as a contribution (the "issue/express" advocacy
divide initially determined by Buckley's magic words formula);' 05 and
how money accumulated by corporate entities could be used in
campaigns. 06 Other commentators have extensively analyzed these
102. See generally supra note 53. Neither faction was happy with Buckley; the
"free speech" wing suggested the impact on free speech is unjustified and produces a
byzantine enforcement regime, while the 'equality' wing found wealth still too
influential in politics in the absence of expenditure limitations.
103. It seems a majority of sitting justices favored overruling Buckley by the
time of Colorado Republican v. Federal Election Commission (Colorado
Republican 1), 518 U.S. 604 (1996). See also Neubome, supra note 53, at 47 ("If
Buckley is a rotten tree just waiting to be pushed over, the question is: which way
will it fall?"). For a more extensive description of this deadlock, see generally
Pamela Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law ofDemocracy, 68 OHIO
ST. L.J. 743 (2007).
104. See Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. at 616 (holding that non-
coordinated expenditures by a party do not count to contribution caps); Federal
Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado
Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 446, 456 (2001) (holding that when expenditures by a
party are coordinated with a candidate, they do count to contribution caps).
105. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 248-
250 (1986) (discussing Buckley's "express advocacy" requirement and holding that
"an expenditure must constitute 'express advocacy' in order to be subject to
[limitations]."). See also Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the
Election/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1755-63 (1999) (explaining the
Supreme Court's definition and analysis of "express advocacy" and how lower
federal courts have applied that definition). In Federal Election Comm'n v. Wis.
Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007), the Court adopted an ultimately much more
permissive perspective on the issue/express advocacy divide.
106. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, 792-95
(1978) (holding general restrictions against corporate spending for a popular
referendum overinclusive and unconstitutional); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
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issues; most relevantly for this argument, the Court continued to define
electoral corruption as quid pro quo between large donors and
candidates.'ov These decisions also affirmed the Court's commitment to
the competitive approach to politics and the idea of a democratic
marketplace.'os In short, the Court's commitment to competitive
anticorruption remained unequivocal in both theory and practice.
None of this needlework, however, produced a satisfactory
campaign finance regime, and in 2002 Congress again took action. The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act' 09 attempted to "plug" 110 the
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1990) (overruled by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 130, S. Ct. 876 (2010) (permitting a general
prohibition on non-segregated independent campaign expenditures by corporations).
Some have observed the Court's argument in Austin is uniquely aligned in the
jurisprudence with the 'equality' theory of speech, arguing it indicates a new
approach to corruption in the Campaign Finance literature. See David Cole, First
Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 236, 271-76 (1991). However, this argument has not aged well; later
cases showed Austin to be an anomalous decision, and Citizens United openly
overruled it. 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 913. More importantly, the idea that the
Court adopted a new theory of politics in Austin for any length of time is
undermined by its continued support for the idea of politics as a competitive process.
See infra note 110.
107. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-95 (2000)
(encapsulating the Court's continued definition of corruption as elected officials
yielding to donors' interests). For a recent instantiation of this principle, see Randall
v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261 (2006) (striking down a state attempt to impose
especially tight campaign finance restrictions in the absence of evidence or
appearance of illicit quid pro quo).
108. For a discussion of how even the Court's more expenditure-restricting
decisions (Austin) contribute to this broader logic, see DWORKIN, supra note 9, at
378-79 (arguing that Bellotti and Austin can be reconciled as seeking to ensure
campaign practices do not "deprive citizens of information that might not otherwise
be available to them"); Julian Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro
Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 109 (1990). These analyses suggest that even
when the Court seemed - anomalously in the context of its other jurisprudence -
to permit equalizing legislation, it was undertaken in defense of a competitive
political dynamic.
109. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (invalidated in part by Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C. (2002)); See
generally Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147 (2004) (offering a comprehensive
measure-by-measure description of BCRA).
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particularly egregious gaps in the Buckley campaign finance regime (soft
money and electioneering communication) while respecting the Court's
constitutional instructions.I' BCRA also demonstrated Congress'
commitment to enact some deliberative anticorruption even in the
shadow of Buckley. One specific concern was that soft money provided
an unregulated opportunity to directly corrupt candidates.112 This raised
both competitive and deliberative concerns, as soft money could serve as
a circuitous quid pro quo vehicle and provide a diffuse means by which
private donors could influence candidates and parties. Likewise,
unsourced communication raised both types of concerns. Since voters
could not always trace the source of campaign information, their ability
to make trusting or discerning political judgments was impaired. 113 This
110. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003)
(overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010) (referring to the soft-money loophole, but the term is an accurate
description of BCRA's general character). McConnell was the Court's initial and
most comprehensive assessment of BCRA, and left most of the regulatory structure
intact. Both BCRA and McConnell were, as contributions to the campaign finance
debate, subjected to substantial criticism. Some argued that BCRA did not do
enough to truly fix the campaign finance system. See, e.g., Richard Briffault,
Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 643, 645 (2003) (arguing that even after the BCRA was passed, candidates still
needed large donors to be competitive). Others, however, attacked McConnell for
failing to address First Amendment concems with sufficient rigor and instead
capitulating to its political overtones. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead,
Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 60-63 (2004) (criticizing the
Court's "blanket calls for deference" towards the legislature in the McConnell
majority opinion); Bruce Cain, Reasoning to Desired Outcomes: Making Sense of
McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 217 (2004) (describing the Court's analysis and
backwards reasoning in McConnell as political, thus making the Court susceptible to
political control).
111. See H. R. REP. 107-131, at 48 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
106, 121 (minority views of Steny H. Hoyer, Chaka Fattah, and Jim Davis) ("The
[BRCA] . . . addresses two of the most serious ills infecting American political
campaigns today: (1) unregulated soft money contributions and (2) undisclosed issue
advocacy."). See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-30 (providing extensive
descriptions of both the soft money and issue advertising challenges).
112. See H. R. REP. 107-131, at 5, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 106, 110.
113. See id. at 50, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 123.
As long as pseudonymous groups are able to communicate to the
electorate, the ability of the electorate to judge the legitimacy of
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had competitive implications - the lack of clarity reduced accurate
preference expression. Yet such communication without accountability
also creates a venue for aggressively private, often highly confrontational
political debate, which increasingly polarized politics and made the
respectful discourse central to deliberation difficult.114
BCRA addressed these problems by restricting soft money
donations and replacing Buckley's 'magic words' formula with a more
precise methodology for identifying independent electioneering.
However, as a tradeoff, BCRA permitted increased hard money
donations to candidates. If Congress could not ensure a broadly public
campaign environment (an original goal of the 1974 FECA), it would
settle for one in which the private elements were at least transparent and
controlled, and the most viciously partisan elements perhaps ramped
down. Thus BCRA sought to subtly reestablish a balance between
competitive and deliberative anticorruption. BCRA permitted a higher
level of transparently competitive quid pro quo influence (through
raising the hard-money donation limits)," 5 but in exchange sought to
the message that is being offered is seriously weakened. Voters
cannot confidently determine how much credibility to lend to a
communication when they do not know the source of the
communication. In short, without real disclosure of the sources of
money funding sham issue ads, the ability of the voters to make
informed decisions is severely undermined.
Id.
114. For a classic example of such an ad, see the Bill Yellowtail ad reproduced
in Jack Beatty, A Sisyphean History of Campaign Finance Reform, ATLANTIC,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/a-sisyphean-
history-of-campaign-finance-reform/6066/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011)
115. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat.
81, 87-88 (invalidated in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47
U.S.C. (2002)). Admittedly, many have criticized this measure as either purely
political or incumbent protection. See H. R. REP. 107-131, at 2, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 107 (The disparate treatment of Representatives and Senators is "cynically
included for no reason other than its sponsors' belief that it increases their chances of
cobbling together a majority on the house floor." Notably, the main Committee on
House Administration Report from which this observation is derived was critical,
rather than supportive of, BCRA.); Charles J. Cooper & Derek L. Shaffer, What
Congress "Shall Make" The Court Will Take: How McConnell v. FEC Betrays the
First Amendment in Upholding Incumbency Protection Under the Banner of
"Campaign Finance Reform, " 3 ELECTION L.J. 223, 225-28 (2004) (arguing that the
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eliminate the non-accountable impact of soft money and electioneering.
This curtailed diffuse, difficult-to-trace influences and correspondingly
placated candidates by increasing regulable (by capping and disclosure)
hard money donations. Because soft money and electioneering are not
deployed directly to candidates, they are more difficult to use as the (real
or apparent) vehicles of quid pro quo exchange. They induce candidates
to be generally private-regarding rather than public-regarding - a type
of deliberative corruption.1 16 By restraining such effects BCRA sought
again to balance direct quid pro quo regulation and promotion of a
deliberative political environment, albeit in a hamstrung form compared
to 1974 FECA.
The Court obliquely condoned the deliberative character of some
BCRA anticorruption measures in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, the initial judicial review of BCRA. McConnell upheld
most of the substantive legislation, and its dicta suggested the Court
might be growing amenable to the deliberative view of corruption. 117 The
Court acknowledged that campaign finance regulation may seek to do
more than prohibit quid pro quo, specifically approving of measures that
promoted public-minded behavior and purity of the campaign
atmosphere. The Court did not indicate that its broader view of
democratic participation extended to its formal definition of corrupt
behavior, leaving it unclear if it still adhered to a competitive view of
BCRA was passed to stop "negative attack" ads and "protect incumbents against
meaningful electoral challenge"); Issacharoff, supra note 53, at 190 (noting that the
BCRA increased limits on hard money, which is easier for incumbents to raise).
116. That is, soft money and electioneering, if they were to corrupt, would do
so in a manner that is more closely analogous to deliberative corruption. In response
to the benefit or harm of campaign funds quasi-independently deployed, candidates
might subtly behave in a more private-regarding manner, both towards soft money
contributors or electioneering advocates (in order to seek their favor) and towards
themselves (because they need to self-interestedly consider the effects of such
uncontrolled campaign resources). BCRA showed a preference for corrupt behavior,
if it were to occur, to occur through open competitive channels.
117. In justifying a form of scrutiny more forgiving to campaign regulation,
the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003),
indicated "Because the electoral process is the very 'means through which a free
society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action,'
contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the
process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate." (quoting Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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corruption. However, the case hinted at possible future comity
between Courts and Congress regarding anticorruption enforcement.
D. A New Extreme in Competitive Retrenchment: Citizens United
However, cracks quickly began to appear in the d6tente
suggested by McConnell, first through the Wisconsin Right to Life
cases. 119 The first case in the series clarified the procedural point that
McConnell did not include a blanket prohibition of as-applied challenges
to BCRA's regulation of electioneering communication.120 The
subsequent WRTL I21 inquired if a particular advertisement comprised
express advocacy equivalent to a contribution, or issue advertising that
fell beyond the zone of governmental regulation.122 In a fractured
118. Commentators on McConnell have disagreed regarding how much the
Court expands its definition of corruption. See Hasen, supra note I 10, at 57-60
(2004) (criticizing McConnell for claiming fidelity to the Buckley anticorruption
rationale while simultaneously so loosening the definition of corruption that the
Court's constitutional analysis is compromised). Cf Cain, supra note 110, at 219-20
(observing that the use of the anticorruption rationale to justify BCRA risks "calling
everything corruption, or implied corruption" but that the Court seemingly intends to
permit the BCRA regulations as "an analogy to conflict of interest regulation";
however, Cain notes that the Court is potentially on the "slippery slope" of
broadening the definition of corruption to the point of uselessness); Briffault, supra
note 109, at 162-67 (observing the broadening of the definition of corruption in
McConnell but describing a broadening that is best characterized as a redefinition of
the terms that comprise a competitive notion of quid pro quo, and in particular
expanding the idea of payoff); Dennis Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption:
Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1037-38
(2005) (lauding the Court for recognizing a new concept of corruption). Hasen and
Thompson see in McConnell a broadening of corruption to include electoral
political integrity. Conversely, Cain and Briffault note the potential for such a move
but conclude the Court still defines corruption as quid pro quo or quid pro quo like
acts, even if it is loosening the definitional terms.
119. Wis. Right to Life v. Federal Election Comm'n (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410
(2006); Federal Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449
(2007).
120. WRTLI, 546 U.S. at 410.
121. WRTL II had only two justices support the Court's opinion. 551 U.S. at
455. Three others concurred in the judgment, but would have struck down
McConnell directly; four others dissented. Id. at 482-504.
122. Id. at 456.
opinion, the Court rejected a number of subtle testsl23 to conclude that
ads were regulable under BCRA only if they were the unequivocal
functional equivalent of express advocacy.124 The Court's first concern
was ensuring political speech was not chilled; 12 however, it also
reiterated the conception of corruption as quid pro quol26 and declaimed
any suggestion that McConnell suggested otherwise.127 Most subtly, the
Court suggested a concept of electoral decision-making based on
competitive information-gathering and individual preference-selection.128
In sum, the decision reinforced the priority of maximum breadth of
unrestricted free speech and the associated treatment of corruption.
On its face, the impact of WRTL was quite localized; it merely
encouraged corporations and organizations that engaged in campaign
advocacy to claim their ads were not the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, and thus fell outside the range of BCRA's electioneering
prohibition. However, this prohibition was originally designed to
advance deliberative political conduct by establishing a broad zone of
public-regardingness. By applying a narrowly competitive test to
determine if ads were "functional express advocacy," and thus fell under
this regulation, the Court stripped the prohibition of much of its
deliberative character.
Three years later, the Court nullified a significant element of
BCRA directly while articulating its most staunchly competitive stance
yet. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,129 the Court
123. Id at 464-69. Among the rejected tests was an intent-based one, which
would mesh well with the deliberative goal of purifying motivation. Id. at 467-69.
124. Id. at 469-70 ("[A] court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.").
125. See id. at 469, 481-82.
126. Id. at 478-79 ("Issue ads like WRTL's are by no means equivalent to
contributions, and the quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating
them. To equate WRTL's ads with contributions is to ignore their value as political
speech.").
127. Id. at 479-80; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)
(overruled in part by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
128. See WRTLII, 551 U.S. at 470 ("An issue ad's impact on an election, if it
exists at all, will come only after the voters hear the information and choose -
uninvited by the ad - to factor it into their voting decisions.").
129. 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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ruled restriction of independent corporate campaign expenditures to be
facially unconstitutional,1 30 eliminating a central pillar in the regulation
of campaign spending. As in Buckley, the Court's decision was
premised primarily on First Amendment rights and on the principle that
corporations possess the same constitutional right to speech as
individuals;' 32 BCRA's regulation of campaign speech by corporate
entities was equivalent to an "outright ban" on speech. 3 Secondly, the
Court's decision was based on a theory of corruption - public figures
act corruptly only when they participate in the most blatant quid pro
134quo.
The Court's reasoning began with competitive democratic
theory. It first presented the indisputable proposition that "[s]peech is an
essential mechanism of democracy;" it allows "citizens to inquire, to
hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus" that comprises
"a precondition to enlightened self-government and necessary means to
protect it."' Ironically, this language evokes the ideals of deliberative
democracy, particularly the suggestion that the goal of discourse is to
reach "consensus." However, the Court had an unequivocally
competitive vision of political communication: it strongly condemned
any government efforts to control or shape communication, 13 6 holding
that the restrictions at issue interfered with the "open marketplace of
ideas".137 By this model, ideal democracy selection consists of
130. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 917; See id at , 130 S. Ct. at 888.
131. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116
Stat. 81, 91-92 (invalidated in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47
U.S.C. (2002)); see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
132. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 904 (citing First Nat. Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976)).
133. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 897.
134. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 901-02.
135. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898.
136. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 899 ("The Government may not .. . deprive
the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers
are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and
the ideas that flow from each.").
137. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 906 (criticizing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)) (internal citation omitted). For a further claim that
more speech equals good speech, see supra note 33.
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maximally-informed consumers making preference-optimizing choices
in a political market.
With this theoretical framework, the Court went beyond strictly
scrutinizing government speech restrictions for chilling effect. It posited
that First Amendment rights are most valuable when they facilitate
political agonism, particularly between voters and government.' This
entails two presumptions prejudicial against deliberative anticorruption:
first, that public structuring of electoral communication is government
oppression, rather than a collective decision to order public life; and
second, that there is a fundamental dichotomy between the citizenry and
the government. This position impairs governmental efforts to promote
deliberative political debate because it holds such efforts impede the
private autonomy upon which political justice relies.' 39
The Court then articulated its most narrowly imagined theory of
competitive corruption. The Court began from the premise, familiar from
Buckley, that corrupt acts must assume a quid pro quo form, and that
independent expenditures pose less of a threat because they are more
difficult to coordinate than corrupt payoffs.140 However, beyond the
practical difficulties, the Court then concluded that no independent
expenditures can "give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption., 141 The Court justified this position through a brazenly
competitive notion of representation:
The fact that speakers may have influence over or access
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are
corrupt . . . . "Favoritism and influence are not . . .
138. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("Speech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable
to the people . . . . Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.").
139. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 904-05 ("The Constitution . . . confers upon
voters, not Congress, the power to choose the Members of the House of
Representatives . . . it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws
to influence the voters' choices.") (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554
U.S. , , 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008)).
140. Id at ,_ 130 S. Ct. at 902 ("[A]bsence of prearrangement and
coordination . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976)).
141. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
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avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of
an elected representative to favor certain policies, and,
by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well
understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the
candidate will respond by producing those political
outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised
on responsiveness."1 42
This stance - a logical outgrowth of the Court's marketized
democratic theory - necessarily curtails deliberative anticorruption.
The Court's other holdings and dicta further buttress this
interpretation. Citizens United upheld disclosure requirements for
expenditures, 143 validating informed citizen preferences as a sufficient
defense against bad political outcomes and self-serving motives. 144
Indeed, the Court's theory of corruption did not even have the apparatus
to recognize as undesirable the motive-shifting of leaders in response to
self-interest, so long as the pressure to act came from constituents in a
manner that did not violate the bright-line quid pro quo rule against
direct donations.
The cumulative effect of Citizens United was to strip federal
campaign finance regulation to a competitive core. The Court eliminated
a central pillar in BCRA's modestly deliberative regime and the
opinion's attendant rhetoric suggests other deliberative measures will
meet a similar fate. 145 Furthermore the Court articulated a starkly
142. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). The Court goes on to suggest that this position is fundamental to a correct
reading of the First Amendment, revisiting the root of the divide in individual rights:
"generic favoritism or influence theory . .. is at odds with standard First Amendment
analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle."
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297.
143. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 914-17.
144. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 910.
145. This predictive claim ignores the partisan divide that underlies Citizens
United; as a hotly contested 5-4 decision, under a Democratic president it may be a
literal heartbeat away from reversal. But so far the various political permutations of
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economic theory of democracy: that good government is a mechanism
for converting private interests into state action. In light of this, the
Court's sympathy for deliberative theories of democracy and
anticorruption expressed in Austin and, less dramatically, in McConnell,
appears anomalous or outdated.
Citizens United also marked a fitting coda to the battle over
campaign finance that began with Buckley. In Buckley, the Court laid out
its basic position - campaign regulation that infringes upon substantial
First Amendment rights is impermissible unless the governmental
interest is preventing explicit quid pro quo. Citizens United pushed this
position to its logical extreme by defining explicit quid pro quo as the
only typologically corrupt conduct, and suggesting that preventing such
quid pro quo is the only legitimate goal of direct electoral regulation.
While this position has its origins in the Court's zealous protection of
individual rights, the implications for the anticorruption are striking:
judicial decisions have nullified deliberative anticorruption efforts in the
campaign finance realm for almost forty years.
IV. OFFICIAL CORRUPTION: THE BATTLE OVER HONEST SERVICES
The evolution of law on official corruption - in the broadest
terms, official action by a governmental figure taken on account of an
illicitly private benefit146 - has taken a meandering path. Official
corruption legislation has not enjoyed the consistent attention and
147
coherent consideration of the campaign finance narrativel4
the Court have not resulted in any change to the Court's commitment to competitive
democracy and anticorruption.
146. Adequately defining official corruption lies at the center of the Court-
Congress debate; this definition merely provides a big-tent starting point. The key
distinction between official corruption and campaign finance is that the former
involves acts taken by officials for private gain, and the latter by candidates for
campaign contributions. As McCormick and Evans, discussed infra Part IV.B.,
demonstrate, this is often a blurry line in practice.
147. At a high level of abstraction, official corruption and campaign finance
corruption doctrines merge. Ultimately, both ask what duties do public figures owe
their constituents, and what external obligations, influences, or gifts might prevent
them from fulfilling these duties? Campaign finance corruption doctrine addresses
the electoral process and how private individuals become public fiduciaries. Official
corruption doctrine inquires into the propriety of acts taken under the guise of
[Vol. 9410 FIR ST A MENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
2011] A STRUGGLE VISIBLE BUT UNSEEN 411
congressional legislation has been diverse and piecemeal,148 the Court's
rulings have been sporadic and frequently unrelated, and the entire
dispute has failed to engender much of an ideological or jurisprudential
firestorm.14 9 Moreover, the most conspicuous line of cases on federal
official government action. Both seek to establish standards of political
accountability and good representation. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 33, at
795-828 (defining corruption in the context of political bribery and campaign
contributions and discussing how the two intersect); Lowenstein, supra note 46. For
a general theoretical discussion, see Philp, supra note 7, at 440. For an attempt to use
campaign finance to inform the less well developed official corruption literature, see
George Brown, The Gratuities Debate and Campaign Reform: How Strong is the
Link?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2007).
148. See Peter Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 793, 798-99 (2001) (characterizing federal anticorruption law as a
"hodgepodge," listing the various measures, and observing the lack of an
overarching scheme); Michael W. Carey, Larry R. Ellis, & Joseph F. Savage, Jr.,
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to Punishing
Breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 301, 324-33, 354 (1991-92) (providing a descriptive overview of federal
anticorruption law, and arguing for their consolidation in a single statute). For an
explanation of why politicians undervalue coherent approaches to anticorruption, see
generally John Dumbrell, Corruption and Ethics Codes in Congress: Ethics Issues in
the U. S. Congress, 6 CORRUPTION& REFORM 147 (1991).
149. The official corruption cases have raised various issues tangential to the
actual nature of anticorruption enforcement. Perhaps most salient of these tangential
issues has been the jurisdictional question: How much of a nexus is necessary
between a corrupt act offense and the federal government to permit federal
prosecution? Federalism concerns are especially salient following the strict reading
of the commerce clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-68 (1995).
Recent Supreme Court cases in the official corruption context have affirmed broad
federal jurisdiction. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604-06 (2004); Salinas
v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997) (both affirming that federal jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 666 only requires a relationship between bribe-receiving party and
state agency or project receiving federal funding); see George Brown, Carte
Blanche: Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials after Sabri, 54 CATH. U.
L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2005) (arguing Sabri and McConnell demonstrate that the
Court believes it is the duty of the federal government to prevent corruption).
One unanswered question from Weyhrauch is if a state law violation is a
prerequisite for federal honest services prosecutions. The non-engagement of the
Court with this particular federalism issue is surprising, though the limitation of
honest services to bribery may alleviate some of the exigency, as unequivocal
bribery is almost universally criminal. Still, the Court seems to implicitly grant the
honest-services fraud statute, § 1346, unique federal anti-bribery jurisdiction over
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anticorruption law - the honest services cases - has been predicated on
individual due process rights and questions of statutory interpretation,
and has not directly addressed the definition of corruption. In the
campaign finance context, the Court explicitly balanced individual First
Amendment rights against government interest in anticorruption, and
thus addressed the nature and efficacy of anticorruption measures.
Conversely, in the honest services cases, individual rights have served as
a simple bar to prosecution, obviating the inquiry into the nature of
corruption. Yet, because the honest services cases have curtailed
deliberative anticorruption, they have mirrored the campaign finance
cases in their impact upon federal anticorruption. The Court has twice
pruned down 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the most wide-reaching federal
anticorruption law, on grounds that it evoked vagueness and notice
concerns. This section begins with the history of § 1346 and its
predecessor, § 1341, climaxing with the Skilling series. It then reviews
the judicial treatment of other federal official corruption laws, in order to
demonstrate the consistently competitive nature of the Court's
underlying theory.
state and local offenders. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
2896, 2934 n.45 (2010). Cf Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. _, _,129 S. Ct.
1308, 1310 (2009) (denying cert.) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Is it the role of the
Federal Government to define the fiduciary duties that a town alderman or school
board trustee owes to his constituents?"). See also Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the
Scope of the Federal Governments Authority to Prosecute Federal Corruption and
State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 699, 700 (2000) (observing honest services law regulates state and
local officials more harshly than federal law regulates federal officials); Roderick M.
Hills, Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions
Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 113, 114-15 (2005)
(arguing federal prosecution of otherwise non-federal state and local corruption
undermines local democracy and damages the federalism balance). A related
question is if honest services creates federal common law. See John Coffee, Modern
Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 427, 431-32 (1998).
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A. The Battle over Honest Services: McNally, Skilling, and the Latest
Demise of § 1341
At the highest level, honest services has been shaped by two
Supreme Court cases and a terse congressional act. The first case,
McNally v. United States,' struck down the expansive use of a long-
standing law, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which prosecutors had cultivated as a
powerful deliberative anticorruption tool, on the grounds such use was
not the original intent of the law. Congress quickly responded with 18
U.S.C. § 1346, which restored § 1341 to its pre-McNally contours. In the
final case, Skilling, the Court, again guided by due process concerns,
constrained the breadth of § 1346, effectively reducing it to a competitive
anticorruption law.152 This sequence mirrors the conflict over
anticorruption in campaign finance law. Even more clearly than in the
campaign finance realm, the Court has intervened in honest services law
to protect individual rights. As a result, the Court's impact on the
competitive-deliberative divide in the honest services context has been
especially oblique. Yet this only highlights that the competitive-
deliberative divide reflects differing foundational investments.
Section 1341 emerged as a potent deliberative anticorruption tool
only thanks to textual ambiguities in a century-old anti-fraud law. 53 The
statute imposes severe criminal penalties upon "[w]hoever, having
devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses",
proceeds to use interstate mails 54 or telecommunications 115 to advance
150. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
151. Id. at 359-60.
152. Skilling, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (2010).
153. The core prohibition of the law, against "any scheme or artifice to
defraud" was first codified in an 1872 reorganization of the postal laws; a 1909
revision added the prohibition against obtaining money or property by false
pretences. The 1909 addition codified language from a late 19th century case,
Durland. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S.
306, 312-14 (1896)). See Jed Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18
DUQ. L. REV. 771, 779-86 (1980) (providing early history of the mail fraud statute).
The debate between broad and strict interpretations of the mail use requirement in
some respects paralleled the current deliberative-competitive conflict. Id at 816-20.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010). The entirety reads:
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such a scheme. The statute can be read as creating an offense with two
necessary conditions, and thus prohibit fraudulent use of mails to obtain
property. Alternately, it can be read disjunctively, with the prohibition on
"obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses"
criminalizing one offense, and the prohibition on "schemes or artifices to
defraud" criminalizing another. The second prong of the disjunctive
reading criminalizes any fraudulent action, even if there is no harm to the
wronged party, thus creating the intangible right to honest services. It
was not until the 1940s' 6 that courts began to apply the disjunctive
reading, but by the early 1980s,'57 the Courts of Appeals had universally
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to
sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or
spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits
or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed,
any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation
occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized,
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in
connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or
emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both.
Id.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2010) (creating an identical offense for wire fraud).
156. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941).
157. By 1982, all Courts of Appeals accepted honest services fraud. Daniel
Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute -A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
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embraced the disjunctive reading and with it the intangible right to
honest services.
In its original form, the intangible right to honest services had
the breadth and adaptability to be a potent and uniquely deliberative
anticorruption tool.' In the public service context, the law could
plausibly reach any behavior where a public official betrayed the duties
owed to the polity. This underspecification allowed for an investigation
of deeper political intentions; "9 enforcement agents and courts were not
limited to condemning a predefined set of illicit behaviors but could
adaptively target any conduct displaying excessively private-regarding
motives.16o The breadth of the law could also encourage deliberation
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 456 (1983). For a more extensive discussion of the history of
1341, see Skilling, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2926-27.
158. In practice, honest services emerged as a uniquely deliberative tool in the
federal arsenal, insofar as it allowed far broader prosecution of self-dealing and
conflict of interest violations. Conflict of interest by federal officials is governed by
more precise (i.e. competitive) federal laws and regulations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
203 (2006) (setting forth the rules of compensation for Members of Congress). Thus,
there exists virtually no other federal law that reaches conflict of interest among state
and local officials. See Beale, supra note 149, at 714 (observing "the potential for
honest services prosecutions to reach conduct that would not fall within the criminal
statutes that govern the conduct of federal officers and employees"). See also Sorich
v. United States, 555 U.S. _, _ , 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (denying cert.) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (criticizing the federal government's role in defining duties of local
officials, especially in the area of honest services).
159. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 161 (1994)
(observing that honest services came to prohibit "a state of mind").
160. Justice Kennedy broached the idea that anticorruption law should focus
on actual intent rather than legal formalities in Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Addressing the general question of when a
payoff is a bribe, he noted
The criminal law in the usual course concerns itself with motives
and consequences, not formalities. And the trier of fact is quite
capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or
actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to them
by the official and the payor.
Id. The fixation on jury instructions runs through McCormick as well and is the core
of the dissent: "the instructions . . . properly focused the jury's attention on the
critical issue of the candidate's and contributor's intent." McCormick v. United
States, 500 U.S. 257, 287 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The emphasis on triers of
fact - juries - is a noteworthy one, because juries are one of the most well-
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among potential offenders; aware that any violation of norms governing
self-interested public conduct, rather than explicitly defined malfeasance,
was potentially criminal, they might have reflected on the general
normative legitimacy of their conduct. In this way, the underspecified
law could encourage greater public-mindedness among public
officials. Finally, the openness of the law demanded that enforcement
agents and courts provide interpretive guidance to define offenses, and
reflect on the norms that should guide enforcement. The result was a
continuous adaption in interpretation of the law. This process eventually
created a body of judge-created law describing specific violations with
some detail, encompassing conduct that would be deemed illicit even in
the narrowest competitive readings (bribery) as well as more nebulous
offenses such as self-dealing and non-disclosure.162
established venues of deliberation in contemporary democracy. See, e. g., Lyn
Carson & Janette Hartz-Karp, Adapting and Combining Deliberative Designs, in
THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK 120-38 (John Gastil & Peter Levine
eds., 2005). However, this emphasis on the substantial nature of corruption inquiries
does not seem to be a consistent thread of anticorruption jurisprudence.
161. See Shiffrin, supra note 39, at 1222-25 (describing the benefits of
standards over rules in inducing deliberation).
162. Most circuit courts included both bribery-style offenses and self-dealing
as honest services offenses by the time of McNally, when, as described infra notes
156-60, the judge-created law was incorporated by statute. See, e.g., United States v.
Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (identifying bribery and self-dealing
as the two forms of prohibited conduct even in the absence of material lost to the
betrayed party); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding failure by a de facto public official to disclose a secret agreement violated
honest services obligations). See also United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 62-
63 (1st Cir. 1998) (post-McNally case assessing honest services law in several
circuits, and concluding it encompassed conduct such as bribes and self-dealing such
as non-disclosure); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 139-144 (2d Cir. 2003)
(examining pre-McNally jurisprudence, but with a focus on the private context).
Rybicki had been described by another circuit court as the "leading opinion on
honest-services fraud." United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 521 (5th Cir. 2006).
The Seventh Circuit was the only pre-Skilling Court to dissent from this reading,
instead adopting a misuse-of-position-for-private-gain standard. United States v.
Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, courts had established
that § 1341 was a specific intent crime, requiring a deliberate intention to defraud.
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 691 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Mail fraud is
a specific intent crime, and so defendants are entitled to introduce evidence of good
faith or absence of intent to defraud." (citing United States v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d
318, 321 (7th Cir. 1994))); United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 549-50 (2d Cir.
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However, its history reveals the intangible right to honest
services originated without direct congressional guidance or approval.163
In light of this, the Court's succinct nullification of the intangible rights
doctrine in McNally was first and foremost a reminder Congress is
responsible for identifying crimes. McNally observed that fraud usually
entails a loss of property by the victim, and neither the language of §
1341 nor the congressional record indicate otherwise.16 The Court then
held, by the rule of lenity, ambiguity in the statute must be interpreted in
favor of the defendants absent explicit congressional intent.s Since it
was unclear if § 1341 criminalized fraudulent conduct without property
loss, and it would be more lenient towards defendants if it held property
loss as a necessary condition, the rule of lenity led the Court to invalidate
the intangible right. The Court then indicated that if Congress wished
1991) (noting that "[g]ood faith is a complete defense" to mail fraud because an
individual must have the "requisite intent to defraud"). The specific intent
requirement narrowed the scope of the honest services offenses, but also
demonstrated § 1341's concern with motive, the main focus of deliberative
anticorruption.
163. The fact that Congress failed to address § 1341's growing reach says little
(at least before its affirmation by § 1346). See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY
DEFAULT RULES 169 (2008) (observing that there is "no effective lobby for
narrowing criminal statutes," and thus that expansive readings of criminal laws
usually go uncorrected by the legislature). Some had observed even before McNally,
however, that § 1341 was exceptional in its breadth. Rakoff, supra note 153, at 771
(speaking as a white-collar prosecutor, described § 1341 as "our Stradivarius, our
Colt 45 [sic], our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart - and our true love" in reference
to its ability to reach a broad array of crimes).
164. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1987) ("As the Court
long ago stated, however, the words 'to defraud' commonly refer 'to wronging one
in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signify the
deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.')
(quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
165. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-60. The majority wrote:
The Court has often stated that when there are two rational
readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are
to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language . . . . There are no constructive offenses; and
before one can be punished, it must be shown that his case is
plainly within the statute. Id. (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
166. Id.
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to include such behavior in § 1341, it must "speak more clearly that it
has." 67
While McNally struck down a deliberative anticorruption law, it
did so while applying well-established interpretive principles. The Court
did not appraise the inherent legitimacy or efficacy of honest services or
its deliberative character but only noted criminal sanctions (presumably
whether deliberative or competitive) must be specified by Congress. The
principles cited by the Court were potentially inauspicious for
deliberative anticorruption, insofar as they favor clarityl68 and
narrowness in judicial interpretation, perhaps to provide defendants with
constitutionally mandated fair notice.' Thus these principles favor the
crisply defined laws of competitive anticorruption and hamper the
breadth and underspecification often characteristic of deliberative
anticorruption.17 0 Yet because McNally does not substantively address
corruption law, it does not reveal the full impact of these principles on
the competitive-deliberative conflict.
167. Id. at 360.
168. Id. (declining to leave the "outer boundaries [of § 1341] ambiguous").
169. The Court has held in the past that the rule of lenity reflects due process
concerns regarding notice. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266
(1997) (holding that "rule of lenity[] ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity
in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered"); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (finding that "'a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear."') (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). See
also Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 471 (1989) (classifying the rule of lenity as the "most celebrated" due process
principle that ensures rule of law). For a description of the constitutional roots of the
fair notice doctrine, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1963).
Others have suggested the rule of lenity is not actually a fair notice doctrine, but
serves other principles. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law
Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1994) (suggesting lenity is actually an incarnation
of a non-delegation principle); ELHAUGE, supra note 163, at 168-76 (arguing the rule
of lenity is designed to elicit legislative preferences).
170. It is a difficult theoretical question - touched on briefly, infra section V,
but in full beyond the scope of this article - if the role of courts in interpreting law
and creating legal rules necessarily undercuts establishment of a deliberative regime.
This is a question ultimately of the nature of legal interpretation. See generally
Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109
(2008) (discussing the Hart-Fuller debate and the determinacy of rules).
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Congress acted the next year on McNally's invitation to "speak
more clearly," preserving honest services with its deliberative qualities
intact. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 restored § 1341 to its pre-McNally state without
any elaboration upon the concept of honest services." Legislative
history suggests Congress considered a bill that defined honest services
offenses in more detail, but ultimately chose to validate the pre-McNally
state of the law without adornment. 17 2
Congress' restoration of honest services to its original form
suggests a conscious commitment to deliberative anticorruption.
Congress retained the breadth and flexibility of the law, allowing
enforcement agents and courts to adaptively inquire into the motives of
public officials. This incorporated shifting norms into the enforcement
and legal regime.174 Thus Congress ensured honest services would
171. The law states in full: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme
or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
172. See The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a),
102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988). Congressional testimony indicated the Senate wished to
pass a more extensive bill, the "Anti-Corruption Act of 1988," which described
honest services offenses in more detail. At least one version of the bill debated in the
Senate imposed the requirements of either gain to the offender, or an intention to
cause loss or harm to the affected organization. 134 CONG. REc. 23,954 (1988)
(statement of Sen. Biden). However, other points of debate in the Senate suggested
that Congress did have the consistent intention of passing a broad law. Id. at 15,046
(statement of Sen. McConnell) (endorsing language designed to include a broader
array of offenses in legislation designed to return honest services to the ken of §
1341). And early in the legislative process, advocates of overturning McNally
evidently had in mind using § 1341 to guarantee good government and public
integrity, rather than narrowly define crimes. 133 CONG. REC. 32,959-61 (1987)
(testimony of Rep. Conyers, suggesting it is the constitutional duty of Congress to
protect the polity from all forms of corruption). Regardless, analysis of the pressures
that shaped the bill remain somewhat speculative - this legislation did not receive
attention as extensive as the 1974 FECA - but by the time it was discussed in the
House, the bill had been reduced to a bare overturning of McNally. 134 CONG. REC.
33,296-97 (1988) (testimony of Rep. Conyers).
173. This is especially true if the general hypothesis put forth by ELHAUGE,
supra note 163, at 168-76, is correct and the purpose of the Court's use of the rule of
lenity in McNally was to elicit congressional preference.
174. Following the passage of § 1346, lower courts turned to pre-McNally
jurisprudence to define the law. See supra note 162. Those attempting to defend the
law pointed to this to argue for § 1346's specificity in the face of vagueness claims.
See Brief for the United States at 13-35, Weyhrauch v. United States, No. 08-1196
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remain a fruitful deliberative forum for norm-assessment and promotion
of public-regardingness.
After this resurrection, the intangible right to honest services
endured harsh criticism on the grounds it was unconstitutionally vague,
failed to provide fair notice, and gave excessive discretion to
prosecutors. 75 When the Court finally addressed these criticisms in
Skilling more than twenty years later, it hobbled honest services, citing,
in particular, constitutional due process concerns. However, defying
honest services' harshest critics, the Court declined to hold § 1346
unconstitutionally vaguel76 and instead observed there was clear
congressional intent "to refer to and incorporate the honest-services
doctrine recognized in the Court of Appeals' decisions before McNally"
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2009), available at 2009 WL 3495337. However, the legislative
history does not itself suggest Congress simply wished to statically instantiate pre-
McNally litigation into law, as opposed to permit for the continual evolution of
anticorruption law. See supra note 172.
175. Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S __ , 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009)
(denying cert.) ("[Section 1346] invites abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in
pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any
manner of unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.") (Scalia, J., dissenting);
cf Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. _ , , 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935 (2010)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (repeating the claims and calling for § 1346 to be struck down
as unconstitutional). See also Transcript of Overcriminalization and the Need for
Legislation Reform, Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, &
Homeland Security at 507 (2009) (statement of Dick Thornburgh, former U.S.
Attorney General), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings
/pdf/Thornburgh09O722.pdf; Moohr, supra note 159 (suggesting honest services
violates federalism, separation of powers, and the First Amendment); George
Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? - Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-
Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 299 (1997) (arguing, either presciently or
causally that "the federalism problem can be greatly alleviated by looking to state
law to define the content of honest services") (Scalia cites this article in his Sorich
dissent, 555 U.S. at , 129 S. Ct. at 1310); Gregory Williams, Good Government
by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137,
170 (1990) (arguing that if the courts or Congress do not define honest services post-
McNally, that "federal prosecutors should develop guidelines clearly delineating the
criteria for federal intervention in the prosecution of governmental and corporate
corruption").
176. Skilling, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2929-30. The Court did
acknowledge that pre-McNally honest services appellate jurisprudence suffered from
"occasion[al] disagreement," id. at _ , 130 S. Ct. at 2930, and that the constituent
cases were "not models of clarity or consistency," id. at _ , 130 S. Ct. at 2929.
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into the meaning of § 1341.177 The Court noted that principle federal
statutes should be saved, when possible, through limited construction.
It then applied this practice by paring honest services down to its "solid
core."l79 It identified this core by consolidating the pre-McNally
appellate holdings. Because the Courts of Appeals were unanimous that
"bribes [or] kickbacks" constituted honest services offenses,' 80 the
Supreme Court interpreted only that area of unequivocal agreement as
statutorily validated by § 1346. By so holding § 1346 to reach only
bribery, Skilling reduced honest services to a narrowly competitive anti-
bribery measure.
As in McNally, the Court did not make a substantive statement
regarding the appropriate form of corruption law; formally, Skilling was
an interpretation of congressional intent via the pre-McNally appellate
case law. The Court acknowledged that the pre-McNally case law
included conflict of interest violations as well as bribery, but dismissed
the body of law as "amorphous."' 8' Yet the real driver of the Court's
reasoning appeared to be due process concerns, particularly vagueness.182
177. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
178. Id at , 130 S. Ct. at 2929 ("It has long been our practice, however,
before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to consider whether the
prescription is amenable to limiting construction.").
179. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2930.
180. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2933. For the Court's definition of bribery, see id.
at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2927 (citing United States v. McNeive, 536 F. 2d 1245, 1249
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (Mass.
1942)). Here, the Court uses the language of fraud in describing an offense similar
to bribery. "When one tampers with [the employer-employee] relationship for the
purpose of causing the employee to breach his duty [to his employer,] he in effect is
defrauding the employer of a lawful right." Skilling, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at
2926 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
181. Skilling, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2932.
182. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 ("Reading the statute to proscribe a wider
range of offensive conduct [than bribery and kickbacks] . . . would raise the due
process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine."). For a judicial bibliography of
the constitutional roots of the vagueness doctrine, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S.
352, 357-58 (1983) ("As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires
that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."). See generally H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 91-94 (1968). As with the rule of
lenity, some have challenged the interpretation and justification of the vagueness
421
The Court was concerned § 1346 did not criminalize self-dealing and
conflict of interest violations through a clear enough legislative mandate.
The Court furthermore indicated that the identification of these type of
conduct lacked sufficient "definiteness and specificity."1 8 3 It was the
potential breadth of these prohibitions that granted § 1346 a deliberative
flexibility. The Court further indicated it was generally dubious of
deliberative anticorruption measures on due process grounds; the Court
went so far as to impute hypothetical legislative intent, speculating that if
Congress had known a broader form of § 1346 would risk rendering the
measure "impermissibly vague . . . . Congress, we believe, would have
drawn the honest-services line, as we do now, at bribery and kickback
schemes."l 84 The Court verified this decision by citing the rule of lenity
to hold that given the lack of explicitness in § 1346, it must be construed
narrowly. The analysis concludes by confidently asserting that by
limiting § 1346 to bribery offenses, the Court has resolved any vagueness
or due process concerns, as bribery is clearly defined, well-established
criminal conduct.'8 6
Thus, the Court's interpretation of § 1346 was driven by a desire
to ensure constitutional viability as well as to reconstruct congressional
intent (or perhaps to creatively interpret congressional intent in a manner
that permitted such viability). Yet the Court elided any evidence in §
1346's construction or its legislative history that the measure was meant
to be deliberative. Moreover, the Court implied that even if Congress
explicitly established broad honest services offenses, but failed to specify
the elements of the offenses with clarity and precision, the law would
doctrine that have been traditionally offered, including by the Court. See generally,
e.g., Tony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (discussing the inconsistencies among the
holdings in cases where the Court used the "vagueness" standard to invalidate laws);
John Calvin Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction ofPenal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 195-97 (1985) (discussing the role of the vagueness doctrine in
criminal law).
183. Skilling, 561 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2933, 44 (providing an extensive
list of questions the government proposal would have to resolve).
184. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2931, 42.
185. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2932-33.
186. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2933 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352,
357 (1983) (holding that with fair notice and arbitrary prosecution concerns
addressed, § 1346 pass constitutional due process muster).
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have had fatal vagueness defects. This is a well-established application
of the vagueness doctrine, but nonetheless demonstrates that the Court's
interpretation of due process principles requires anticorruption laws to
assume a competitive format.
Skilling is the clearest demonstration of the conflict between
deliberative anticorruption and due process. The Court suggested that
anticorruption measures must be precisely articulated to avoid vagueness
defects. Because deliberative anticorruption law relies upon breadth,
flexibility, and discretion - the core defects of vagueness - it appears
the Court will require anticorruption laws to adhere to a competitive
format. Furthermore, in light of Skilling and McNally, both based in
lenity and recognizing constitutional protection of fair notice, it now
appears a predecessor claim that due process will prevent deliberative
anticorruption. The parallel with campaign finance is clear: years after
cases that established the theoretical foundations for their recent
decisions, the Court has recently - and more definitively -
demonstrated that its treatment of individual rights is antithetical to
deliberative anticorruption.
B. Trends in Corruption: Official Corruption before the Supreme Court
The substance of anticorruption law has been the Court's
primary concern in neither of the main case lines considered so far. In the
honest services context, the impact on anticorruption was indirect; in the
campaign finance context, anticorruption was addressed only insofar as it
was balanced against free speech. However, three modem cases -
McCormick, Evans, and Sun-Diamond - have addressed the specific
substance of public anticorruption.'87 While the cases do not comprise an
especially coherent narrative and address fairly narrow black-letter
questions, they provide some clarification of the Court's view of
corruption. The decisions suggest the Court conceptualizes politics as a
187. A number of other cases have dealt with corruption, but have not
involved on the substance of public corruption law. The most notable is the line of
federal jurisdiction cases, described in detail, in supra note 149. Other cases have
dealt with the connotations of the word "corrupt" as a modifier for a particular act,
(i.e. corrupt persuasion), but have referred to a general state of evil-mindedness
rather than specific betrayal of fiduciary trust. See United States v. Aguilar, 515
U. S. 593, 599-600 (1995).
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market driven by self-interest (a position intimated in Buckley and openly
expressed in Citizens United). Therefore, elected or appointed officials
behave acceptably when they engage in private-regarding action, so long
as they do not transgress explicit conditions of public service.
McCormick, the earliest of the three cases, overturned the
conviction of a state representative for receiving bribe-like contributions
on procedural grounds, but its ultimate reasoning demonstrated the
Court's broadly competitive view of politics. A state representative was
convicted under the Hobbs Act for soliciting a contribution from a
special interest group. The appellate court concluded he was clearly
soliciting a bribe rather than a legitimate campaign contribution and
upheld his convictions. In reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding
the case, the Court pointed to a procedural defect: the appellate court had
affirmed the official had accepted a bribe on the basis of a factual
determination that was never properly before a jury.190 The deficiency of
the jury instruction was a failure to define quid pro quo with sufficient
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). The relevant part of the Act prohibits "extortion
... under color of official right." The Hobbs Act was an addition to the Anti-
Racketeering Act of 1934, a measure directed against organized violence, and
specifically designed to expand its reach to violence by unions. Courts have, over the
past fifty years, generally permitted it to be used against any economic crime, and its
prohibition of extortion under "official right" has become a main federal anti-bribery
tool. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1991) (describing the
expansion of the "color of official right" prong); Michael McGrail, Note, The Hobbs
Act After Lopez, 41 B.C. L. REv. 949, 959-66 (2000) (providing a detailed history of
the Hobbs Act). It is long accepted at common law that bribery and extortion are
equivalent crimes. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1992). But see id.
at 280-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that extortion and bribery were not
seen as analogous crimes). See generally James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and
Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695 (1993)
(ultimately holding it is logical to view bribery and extortion as overlapping crimes).
It is curious that the Court has permitted the federal government to expansively
use the Hobbs Act while curtailing § 1341, though the conservative wing of the
Court has questioned this expansion. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Evans, 504 U. S. at 290-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This may be
explained by the Court's willingness to permit expansive anticorruption jurisdiction
even as it constrains anticorruption substantive law. The Hobbs Act may provide
jurisdictional reach, but the targeted behavior is basically bribery.
189. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 259-60. For a more incriminating reading of the
facts, see id. at 281-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 269-70.
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narrowness. In order to convict an elected official under the Hobbs Act
for what is claimed to be a campaign contribution, the Court held such
payments must be made "in return for an explicit promise or undertaking
by the official to perform or not to perform an official act" such that "the
official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of
the promise or undertaking."'19' The Court further indicated "proof of a
quid pro quo would be essential" for conviction.' 9 2 While leaving it "not
... impossible" for candidates to commit bribes while seeking campaign
contributions,' 93 McCormick raised a strikingly high standard for Hobbs
Act prosecutions where an official can claim the offering was a
campaign contribution,' 94 particularly given the surreptitiousness or
implicitness of much corrupt conduct.
McCormick's test for bribery is the epitome of narrowly
competitive anticorruption law. The Court justifies the holding by
presenting a fundamentally competitive theory of politics:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will
benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is
the everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that
campaigns must be run and financed. Money is
constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who
run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of
their views and what they intend to do or have done.
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may
indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal
crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of
constituents or support legislation furthering the interests
of some of their constituents, shortly before or after
191. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). The holding in this case was limited to the
question of when Hobbs Act bribery convictions are not bribes because they are
campaign contributions, and did not reach cases where such an exemption was not
claimed. Id. at 268.
192. Id. at 273.
193. Id. Cf supra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining that some
favoritism and influence is unavoidable in a democratic system premised on
responsiveness).
194. See supra note 33 and accompanying text, for a discussion of evidentiary
difficulties. See also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[Anti-bribery] law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and
nods.").
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campaign contributions are solicited and received from
those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what
Congress could have meant by making it a crime to
obtain property from another, with his consent, "under
color of official right." To hold otherwise would open to
prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought
to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns
are financed by private contributions or expenditures, as
they have been from the beginning of the Nation. It
would require statutory language more explicit than the
Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion.' 9 5
This is a straightforward articulation of competitive democracy.
Public duty is defined by the aggregative preference - which can be, in
effect, purchased - of constituents, rather than the collective good or
holistic norms. Moreover, the Court characterizes politics as a reciprocal
market: politicians wish to be elected, and constituents wish to have
governmental action taken on their behalf, so the two groups bargain to
satisfy their preferences.196 And it bears note that there is some irony in
McCormick's call for more explicit statutory language following Citizens
United and Skilling. As this article has demonstrated, the Court has
struck down on other grounds attempts to broaden anticorruption efforts.
Within a year, the Court faced a remarkably similar fact pattern
and came to a substantively diametrical, if not formally contradictory,
conclusion. 197 In Evans v. United States, a federal undercover agent
made a contribution to a public official, who never openly demanded the
money. The public official reported some of this money as a campaign
195. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272-73.
196. The dismissive remark on ethical obligations and the invocation of the
'real' practice of historical politics elicits the brand of competitive democracy
described by Judge Posner, in supra note 6.
197. Lowenstein, supra note 46, at 130, ("[W]hether Evans actually modifies
McCormick, and if so to what degree, is unclear."). See also Steven Yarbrough, The
Hobbs Act in the Nineties: Confusion or Clarification of the Quid Pro Quo Standard
in Extortion Cases Involving Public Officials, 31 TULSA L. J. 781, 816 (1996)
(describing post-Evans Hobbs Act public official jurisprudence as "in disarray"). It
is tempting to read the cases in a legal realist mold, and focus on the swings in
individual justices: the justices who dissented in the respective cases formed two
mutually exclusive groups.
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contribution,198 but was nonetheless convicted of violating the Hobbs
Act. 199 The narrow legal question before the Court was if an official must
have "demanded or requested the money, or . . . conditioned the
performance of any official act upon its receipt" to violate the Hobbs
Act, or if passive acceptance can suffice to prove quid pro quo. 2 00 Based
201
on the common law definition of extortion, the Court affirmed the
conviction, concluding that passive acceptance is sufficient. The Court
also held that an official need not fulfill the pro quo to commit the
offense.202 Furthermore, the Court rejected the requirement that an
official must actively "induce[]" a party in order to extort it; the very
possession of public power granted coercive power to the illicit official
203
action.
On its face, Evans merely established the minimum conditions to
sustain an official's bribery conviction under the Hobbs Act - the trier
of fact must find that the "public official has obtained payment to which
he was not entitled, knowing that payment was made in return for official
acts." 20 While subtle, the Court's focus on motive gives the opinion
deliberative drift. So long as the official acted in a manner that the trier
of fact believes to demonstrate an intention to exchange public action for
illicit private gain, a Hobbs Act violation stands. The Court, in essence,
concluded the trier of fact should generally assess the official's state of
mind. Yet Evans' black-letter holding reveals that even when the Court
faced clearly illicit corrupt behavior, permitted the conviction only by
contorting the idea of quid pro quo to fit the facts. Thus, even if Evans
hinted at a substantive deliberative theory of anticorruption, the Court
insisted upon formal quid pro quo to support the conviction. This
suggests the Court's discomfort with abandoning the foundation of
competitive anticorruption.
The most recent federal case to substantively address corrupt
behavior endorsed a competitive structure to anticorruption law. In Sun-
198. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (chastising the
majority for failing to address evidence the transfer was a campaign contribution).
199. Id. at 257-58.
200. Id. at 258.
201. Id. at 259-67.
202. Id. at 268.
203. Id. at 266.
204. Id. at 268.
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Diamond, a high-ranking federal official was accused of accepting gifts
from a trade organization the official regulated,205 thus violating the
illegal gratuity provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 201. 206 The specific question
before the Court was if a conviction for illegal gratuities receipt required
the payoffs to the official to be connected to the performance of specific
public acts. The Court concluded a gratuity must be connected to an
"official act" performed by the public official, not merely the official's
office or generalized "capacity to exercise governmental power or
influence in the donor's favor."207 The Court suggested that a broader
interpretation would clash with a natural reading of the statute and might
have "peculiar results," such as criminalizing trivial or sentimental
tokens given to public officials.208 The Court further indicated that more
precise statutory language would be necessary to criminalize such broad
swaths of behavior. Pointing to the wide array of corruption statutes that
define other offenses, the Court concluded Congress would have spoken
more precisely if it wished to criminalize the general receipt of gifts
201
while in public office.
Sun-Diamond offered a convincing reading of the illegal
gratuities statute, insofar as "official act" and "official position" are not
205. United States v. Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S. 398, 400-01 (1999). The donor
was also charged in the case, and is the named defendant.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) defines two crimes, bribery and the less severe
crime of giving or receiving unlawful gratuities. Both prohibit the "corrupt" transfer
of a payoff to a public official with the intent to influence official action by that
official, and in parallel prohibit the receipt of such by the public official. For
gratuities, the nexus between the act and the payoff need not be as well-established;
while a bribe requires a direct quid pro quo relationship between gift and act, an
illegal gratuity only requires that the gift act as a reward for a future or past action.
Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S. at 404. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 33, at 796-97
(breaking down the law on bribery and unlawful gratuity); Lowenstein, supra note
46, at 130-35 (analyzing the law on both bribery and illegal gratuities). Brown, supra
note 147, at 1372, argues the statute is poorly drafted and confusing.
207. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405-06 (emphasis and internal quotations
omitted).
208. Id. at 406-07 (suggesting that a broader reading of 18 U.S.C. § 201 would
criminalize a baseball cap given to a U.S. Cabinet member by a visiting high school
principal).
209. Id. at 408-12 ("[A] statute in this field that can linguistically be
interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the
latter.").
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interchangeable concepts. Its holding resulted in a law that sweeps more
narrowly, but this seems attributable to accurate judicial interpretation.
That said, the case saw no impropriety in the receipt of substantial gifts
by a high-ranking federal official who was to assess matters relevant to
the donor, suggesting the Court was broadly tolerant of self-interested
behavior by public official. Implications of the gifts' triviality aside, the
donee in Sun-Diamond received thousands of dollars in gifts. However,
the Court's broader competitive perspective is most apparent in its
structural description of corruption law. The Court indicated the statute
at issue "is merely one strand of an intricate web of regulations .
governing the acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by
public officials." 210 Each law ought to be interpreted as a "scalpel" rather
than a "meat axe" so the "regulatory puzzle" fits together.211 This
description of an anticorruption regime is seminally competitive:
corruption laws should be crisp and precise, defining specific offenses.
Such a view curtails the possibility of broad or adaptive laws suited for
general inquiry into motives or broad-based promotion of public-
regardingness.
McCormick, Evans, and Sun-Diamond are a sufficiently diverse
set of cases to render any generalizations tentative, at least on the
holdings. McCormick is the most easily integrated into the existing
narrative this article has constructed, providing additional evidence that
the Court conceives of democratic representation as a self-interested
driven, market-style dynamic. However, Evans' contrary holding in the
context of such a similar fact pattern complicates any conclusion drawn
from McCormick. At a broader level, the most striking pattern may be
the more ambitious, structurally oriented, and ultimately normative
accounts of law and politics offered by the competitive-outcome
decisions. McCormick (in its defense of transactional relationships
between officials and voters) and Sun-Diamond (in its depiction of a
precisely woven anticorruption regime) both offered broader visions than
Evans, which engaged in a narrow reconstruction of a particular term in
the context of a single statute (and ultimately retreated to the definition
of quid pro quo to support a corruption conviction). As such, the
210. Id. at 409.
211. Id. at 412.
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competitive view may have more theoretical momentum than any
deliberative anticorruption sentiment in the Court.
This point is particularly trenchant in the context of the fate of
honest services. The Court's holdings reflected commitment to some of
the most fundamental principles of individual rights protection and
statutory interpretation. As a result, even if the subsequent effect on
anticorruption law - pushing it towards narrowly competitive molds -
was inadvertent, it was founded in well-entrenched judicial principles.
The force of the Court's claims in McCormick and Sun-Diamond -
reflective of core views on law and politics - reinforce this sense that
this competitive tendency has powerful theoretical roots.
PART THREE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The conflicts over campaign finance and official corruption
demonstrate a subtle but long-standing conflict between courts and
Congress over anticorruption legislation. This section pursues three
interpretive questions: why has this conflict occurred, what are the
practical implications, and what is the appropriate direction for future
policy? The first of the following sections considers possible underlying
judicial motivations for ardently advancing a competitive anticorruption
regime. The Court has generally played the role of spoiler in the conflict,
thwarting deliberative legislation. While this article has observed a
correlation between the protection of constitutional rights and the Court's
antideliberative holdings, it is helpful to consider deeper structural
reasons for the Court's position. The second section considers the
implications of this struggle for the nature of democratic governance and
the effects of various future efforts to reform anticorruption on such
governance.
V. A UNIFIED VIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE
A. The Generalized Picture: Balancing the Public and the Private
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The two lines of law analyzed in this article reveal a distinct
212pattern in the judicial treatment of anticorruption. When Congress has
passed competitive measures, 213 the Court has typically taken no action.
When, however, Congress has passed deliberative anticorruption
measures, the Court has, by interpretation or outright invalidation,
nullified them for violating various constitutionally protected individual
rights.
212. It is possible to discuss the perspective of Supreme Court anticorruption
jurisprudence with a degree of coherence unavailable for congressional
anticorruption legislation. Congress has passed a wide variety of legislation designed
to fight corruption, ranging across the competitive-deliberative spectrum and
unreflective of a single coherent regime or plan. See supra note 148. Consequently,
making generalizations about congressional posture is difficult. However, this article
has not claimed that Congress has adopted, either consciously or effectively, a
specifically deliberative or competitive approach to anticorruption, or even chosen to
assume a particular point on a spectrum between them. This article merely observes
that, whenever Congress has, for whatever reason, chosen to pass deliberative
anticorruption legislation, the Court has inevitably opposed it in favor of a
competitive approach. This article can treat Congress as a black box which outputs
various anticorruption measures, and the claim regarding judicial conduct has the
same force.
That is not to say it is impossible to speculate as to why Congress has
continued to pass deliberative legislation even in the face of judicial disapproval.
Legislating against crime is always popular with the constituency, particularly
legislation that will purportedly increase public accountability. In this respect, public
corruption is low-hanging fruit; it is politically popular yet uncontroversial.
Deliberative legislation, cutting in broad swaths, can be particularly robust or
powerful, or at least appear so. This is an especially compelling explanation when
there are historical pressures, such as Watergate. Secondly, without the particular
constitutional interests of the Court, Congress just might be more willing to try a
broad variety of measures, and some of these happen to be deliberative. Finally,
Congress can use deliberative corruption legislation to punish its worst members and
it can trust norms will not target the majority. Therefore, the majority of politicians
wish to prevent a worse minority from exploiting formalist loopholes (essentially
preventing internecine parasitism), and might do so through deliberative
anticorruption laws.
213. Many congressional anticorruption laws are competitive in nature,
attacking quid pro quo bribery or similar crimes with bright-line prohibitions. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (the
Hobbs Act). Likewise, as demonstrated above, the competitive elements of 1974
FECA were left standing, and the honest services doctrine was converted to a
competitive anticorruption law.
The direct impact has been straightforward: American
anticorruption law is a competitive regime and facilitates competitive
democratic practices.214 Since neither Court nor Congress has provided a
comprehensive account of what makes conduct corrupt, fully unpacking
this position requires consideration of the baseline definition of
corruption as the unacceptable influence of private motives on public
211decision-making.
Since competitive democracy conceives of government as a
particular arena in which individuals fulfill their individual preferences,
the status of a political motive as private does not inherently vitiate it.
Indeed, there are no truly "public" motives in competitive democracy,
merely private ones216 advanced in the political context. However,
motives are condemned when they violate the rules of the public
decision-making framework; this is necessary to protect the system's
structural integrity. Yet the implication is that corrupt motives are
unacceptable not because they violate norms of public-regardingness, but
because, by disrupting the implementation of governance, they can harm
the private individuals who constitute the polity. Corruption impairs the
ultimate goal of politics: the accurate translation of aggregate private
interest into governmental action. Competitive anticorruption laws are
bulwarks against breaches of this system. Because their straightforward
purpose allows them to be crisply delineated, they have tended to survive
judicial review and its focus on vagueness and overbreadth.
Yet the Court's preference for competitive anticorruption is not
coincidental. Because it conceptualizes corruption's harm in individual
terms, competitive anticorruption is intelligible to an institution focused
on the protection of individual rights. The Court has a foundational
mandate to protect certain individual rights enumerated in the
Constitution. These rights demand government non-interference with
certain zones of private conduct - much as competitive anticorruption
seeks to ensure that governmental processes adequately reflect
constituents' private interests. Thus competitive anticorruption measures
214. See supra Sections LA, II.C.
215. See supra Section II.A.
216. Motives and preferences may, of course, be altruistic or collectively
oriented, and thus normatively public. Whether they are from a philosophical or
moral perspective is not relevant for the purpose of competitive democracy.
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and individual rights share the same end: ensuring that governmental
processes benefit (or do not illegitimately harm) private individuals.2 17
Conversely, deliberative corruption is defined by collective
public norms. In ideal deliberative democracy, individuals would justify
their conduct through discursive engagement with other citizens.
Conduct would be corrupt when its motivations are unacceptable to the
polity. While in practice deliberative anticorruption can only simulate
idealized discursive engagement, corruption at root is still defined by
failure to satisfy shared standards. By prioritizing collective norms over
the impact on private individuals, deliberative anticorruption assumes a
position that is alien to the Court's mandate. The Court has a structural
obligation to protect individual rights, but has no particular obligation to
advance these standards of public service.21 Thus, when faced with a
deliberative anticorruption law, the Court will have a strong tendency to
strike it down or convert it to a competitive form.
217. The Court's protective posture towards individual rights also manifests in
its underlying normative justification for a competitive regime. In many of its
decisions, the Court has suggested politics is a market determined by self-interested
exchanges between citizens and electorate, and criticized deliberative anticorruption
because it seeks to interfere with this dynamic. See McCormick v. United States, 500
U.S. 257, 272-73 (1991) ("[T]o hold that legislators commit the federal crime of
extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation
furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign
contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic
assessment. . . ."); Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. _, _,
130 S. Ct. at 876, 904-06, 909-10 (2010) (The Court goes at length to state that
corporate influence in politics will not cause voters to distrust the political process.
"The appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith
in our democracy."). The political-participant-as-market-actor model is a logical
outgrowth of the focus on individual rights; both establish a bright boundary of non-
collective interference around individual conduct. However, this alignment has the
ancillary effect of coordinating the Court's view of politics with the foundational
assumptions of competitive democracy, which imagines individuals as self-
interested preference-satisfiers. But see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 50-51 ("[M]uch of
modem constitutional doctrine reflects a single perception of the underlying evil: the
distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely
because those benefited have exercised the raw power to obtain governmental
assistance.").
218. Cf infra Section V.B.ii (discussing the Court's emphasis on protecting
individuals against harm from political bodies while neglecting to provide
protections to the political bodies themselves).
Of course, democracies inevitably blend competitive and
deliberative aspects, and in practice target corruption on both deliberative
(norm-protecting) and competitive (private-individual-protecting)
grounds. Deliberative anticorruption enforcement instantiates public
values, punishing conduct that violates shared norms. Competitive
anticorruption targets behavior that directly threatens the adequate
provision of government service to citizens. Congress' deployment of
both competitive and deliberative measures illustrates this diversity of
aims. The competitive elements of 1974 FECA were designed to prevent
legislators from falling under influences that would make them
prejudiced public servants; the deliberative elements were designed to
create an electoral atmosphere that was more broadly public-
regarding. 219 The various simple bribery measures prevent the
conversion of public goods into illicit private gain;220 the honest services
doctrine protected not just the waste of government resources, but the
character of public service. 22 1
The Court's imposition of an exclusively competitive
anticorruption regime has been to deny one of these aspects of
anticorruption. The standing judicially mandated regime is one attentive
to the potential of anticorruption law to serve citizens' private welfare,
but that has little room for advancing shared norms or protecting
uniquely public goods.
B. Beyond Individual Rights: Systemic Explanations for the Court's
Position
The subsequent question is why the Court has approached
democratic practice and individual rights so as to favor competitive
anticorruption law. This section provides possible structural explanations
for the rejection of deliberative democracy and use of individual
219. See supra Section ll.A.
220. See, e.g., supra note 149 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 666, which is essentially
designed to protect federal funds from being embezzled by corrupt recipients).
221. See supra Section ll.A. (discussing the disjunctive reading of honest
services as criminalizing fraudulent conduct even without material harm).
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rights. This reveals other stakes in the anticorruption debate and points
to a more unified explanation for the Court's stance.
i. Adversarial Procedure and Rights Protection
The American judicial system has a strong commitment to
adversarial procedure, the idea that fair process requires the opportunity
to confrontationally contest issues before a neutral arbiter.223 The
adversarial process is seen as an especially important mechanism for
protecting individual liberty, including the particular rights at issue in
central corruption narratives - rights to speech and association224 and
225to due process.
222. There is one explanation this essay will not explore: that the Court's
internal politics, and in particular, its conservative drift in the past few years, are
responsible for its competitive stance. Political explanations fail on several fronts.
They lack sufficient explanatory power. To characterize the Court as having a
certain partisan political stance may map on to certain holdings, but it does not map
on to the broad sweep of competitive anticorruption over either time or topic.
Citizens United may have been a partisan decision (though Buckley, or at least the
holding, was not), but the relevant holding in Skilling was unanimous in judgment.
And, if Citizens United can be claimed to demonstrate a relationship between the
conservative wing and a stronger defense of competitive democracy, other cases
contradict it. See, e. g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 489 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (as dissenting minority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas, and Scalia would uphold broad federal prophylactic
measures and generally defer to federal anticorruption efforts). Secondly, even if a
partisan position by the Court, or a dominant partisan bloc within it, seems to be
facially responsible for competitive corruption holdings, this explanation alone is
under-determinative. Positions on corruption can fall anywhere on the political scale.
For example, an interest in defending individual rights can be seen as traditionally
liberal, and cut against broad, deliberative anticorruption measures, yet constraining
the power of the federal government can have the same effect but be classified as a
traditionally conservative concern.
223. See generally, e.g., BOB KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (arguing that the adversarial system imposes
significant costs in terms of time, money, and predictability); David Super, Are
Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique oflIndividual Rights, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 1051 (2005) (arguing the adversarial approach regulates markets efficiently).
224. See, e.g., Henry Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV.
L. REV. 518-20 (1970) ("[C]ourts have lately come to realize that procedural
guarantees play an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech.").
225. See KAGAN, supra note 223, at 61-81.
However, a strong commitment to adversarial procedure is
difficult to reconcile with deliberative democracy. Deliberative politics
are mutualist, non-hierarchical, and consensus-preferring. Adversarial
procedure is binary, winner-take-all, and resolved by an authoritative
figure. Moreover, the character of deliberation - collaborative
engagement and empathetic discourse - does not mesh well with the
zealous self-interested advocacy characteristic of adversarial
confrontation. Resorting to adversarial procedure suggests that
deliberative politics have failed. Moreover, the specific goals of
deliberative anticorruption are not ideally suited to adversarial
mechanisms. Deliberative anticorruption encourages good motives in
order to create publicly minded officials, not merely the coercive
enforcement of tolerable behavior. It does not, as it were, seek only an
outcome but a transformative process.
In practice, the adversarial critique of deliberative anticorruption
has more bite. Deliberative laws restrict individual behavior without the
clarity of the adversarial/competitive approach. Broad prophylactic
restrictions, designed to ensure public-minded conduct, do not give
constrained parties the opportunity to advocate for the acceptability of
their conduct. Likewise, laws that define self-serving behavior in a vague
manner can prevent the prosecuted party from knowing exactly what to
defend against, or even what specific behavior to avoid.
Deliberative anticorruption's practical incompatibility with the
adversarial process can be seen as the root of the Court's rejection of
such measures. The tension is obvious in the context of due process
rights - vaguely defined laws place regulated parties at a serious
disadvantage when confronting accusations brought by prosecutors.
226More subtly, the competitive, market-oriented democratic theory
underlying some of the Court's decisions produces an adversarial
conception of politics. Competitive democracy involves adversarial
confrontation between opposed candidates or parties, with voters acting
as arbiters. The Court has endorsed an idea of politics that vets
candidates and positions through the "marketplace of ideas" and struck
226. See supra note 217 (discussing the Court's focus on protecting individual
rights and the resulting outgrowth of seeing the political landscape as a competitive
realm populated by self-interested actors).
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227down regulations that impair this process. The apparent concern is that
government intervention will prevent the adversarial resolution of
political disagreement. Thus, in defending individual rights - whether
in the criminal or electoral contest - courts guarantee citizens the
opportunity to robustly context legal and political decisions in an
adversarial context. The Court's favoring of competitive anticorruption
law is a consequence of this investment in the adversarial process.
The Court's commitment to an adversarial resolution may be
further traced to the Court's own practices and purpose. Courts, insofar
as they are mechanisms for adversarial confrontation, will conceptualize
fair dispute opportunities in those terms. Supervising and resolving
adversarial confrontation - at least in common law countries - is what
courts do. Approaches that redefine such resolution both challenge the
concept of fairness underlying traditional judicial review and threaten the
228
status of the court as a basic mechanism for dispute resolution. Thus,
the Court's ardent defense of the adversarial resolution may relate not
only to its efficacy, but to the Court's own nature.
ii. The Judicial Concept of Politics and the Priority of the Individual
The Court's preservation of the adversarial process may protect
individual rights in the face of government intrusion. This posture,
however, reflects particular institutional commitments of the Court.
Guided by a constitutional mandate, federal courts have performed two
main roles in public law: defending individuals against government
interference 229 and enforcing federalism and the division of power to
227. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 914 (2010); See also DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 357 (discussing differing
views of democracy).
228. See KAGAN, supra note 223, at 242-50.
229. There are some questions related to this issue that the Court has always
had to attend to in the plain text of the Constitution - what is free speech, what is
cruel and unusual punishment? - and based on the level of ambiguity, resolve the
question more or less creatively. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
16 (1980). In the past century, the battleground over where rights exist has expanded
to new territory, particularly substantive due process and the nature of equality.
Perhaps the most famous comment on this is Justice Jackson's footnote 4 in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), as it proposes a
theory for when the government should be more willing to intervene to protect
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ensure government bodies do not metastasize beyond their
constitutionally established boundaries.2 30 Conversely, the Court's public
law jurisprudence has not been attentive to the need for internal
government regulation, including the need for effective anticorruption.
This may be unsurprising, as there is neither a constitutional mandate for
231
nor a strong tradition of courts performing such monitoring. Yet,
perhaps because the values of state integrity receive no unique weight
and other values do, the Court has adopted principles that are prejudiced
against effective internal government regulation. One manifestation is
that the Court has come to favor bright-line, competitive-style rules -
forms of law well-suited to protecting individual rights and structural
boundaries but less apt at encouraging inherently reliable governance.
Consequently, the Court is attentive to the harm political bodies may
inflict on individuals and other governmental institutions - but pays
little heed to the needs and pressures within the political bodies
themselves.
This feature of the Court's jurisprudence emerges from the same
characteristic that poses corruption law's unique challenges. When a
corrupt individual violates a polity's expectations of trust and loyalty, he
232betrays a collective of which he is part. Corruption thus raises the
difficult problem of how to assess and prevent such internal bad acts.233
However, both types of traditional public law address conflicts between
distinct entities - either between individuals and the government or
between discrete governmental bodies. The Court's public law
jurisprudence usually does not address the types of problems raised by
individual rights (that is, when the individuals at issue may be uniquely politically
disempowered due to their status as discrete and insular minorities).
230. That the Court plays a fundamental role in enforcing the division of
powers between branches of the government, and between the federal government
and the states, is apparent in the cases from the Court's early jurisprudence that are
still of the greatest relevance today: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and
Maryland v. McCulloch. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
231. As this essay has observed, some have argued such a constitutional
mandate exists - it has just been neglected. See supra note 79.
232. In a related vein, some academic commentators have indicated the need
for Madisonian public virtue to sustain democratic governance. See Sunstein, supra
note 8; Gardner, supra note 79.
233. This harkens back to the concept of corruption. See supra note 29.
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membership of the citizenry in the polity and the attendant
responsibilities.
Of course, an individual facing restriction of his rights or
charged with a criminal offense will likely assume a defensive
oppositional posture, even if the individual originally assumed a
voluntary role in the shared project of politics. And from the perspective
of competitive theory, such an adversarial approach is universally
appropriate, for competitive politics presumes every individual in the
political structure is self-interested. Yet if politics has distinctly
collective obligations, the Court systematically distorts anticorruption by
ignoring this collective character while prioritizing other values. Such a
distortion ultimately restricts deliberative anticorruption measures.
iii. The Court Deliberative: Institutional Self-Preservation and
Judicial Uniqueness
A third, most speculative explanation for the Court's posture
towards corruption originates from judicial self-preservation, rather than
from any normative alignment. By curtailing internal deliberative
anticorruption, the Court maintains for itself a uniquely deliberative role
in the current political landscape. If other elements of the government
begin to operate deliberatively, they supplant the interpretive function
currently fulfilled by the Court.
If the elected branches of federal government - the legislative
and executive - are presumed to operate competitively, then actors in
the judicial system occupy a uniquely deliberative niche. Juries are
expected to consider evidence, engage in debate, and reach consensus as
a decision-making process.234 Judges, even acting alone, engage in a
similar process of contemplation and reflection, albeit often considering
issues of fact rather than law.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court suggested that careful
reflection reminiscent of deliberative democracy is obligatory, rather
than aspirational, for judges. Caperton v. Massey held an elected state
supreme court justice violated a litigant's right to fair trial when he failed
to recuse himself from a case directly affecting the interests of a major
234. See supra note 160.
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contributor to the judge's campaign. From a legal perspective,
Caperton was the inverse of the cases that have been discussed in this
article. Because the harmed party may have had his right to a fair trial
violated by corrupt conduct, individual due process served a vehicle of
anticorruption, rather than a potential barrier to regulation or prosecution.
If one takes the judicial investment in protecting individual rights at face
value, this may explain the outcome of the case.
Yet Caperton was a de facto anticorruption inquiry: what
motives (or apparent motives) taint conduct by a public official? In
concluding the judge may have been improperly influenced, the Court
thoughtfully considered the psychology of motivation, bias, and
objectivity.23 6 Even though the form of the influence was perfectly legal,
and there was no formal impropriety, the Court held that an inference -
albeit compelling - of influence necessitates recusal. Indeed, the
Court's ruling might be seen as anti-democratic; it nullified the decision-
making of an elected judge for potentially being biased, even though the
237bias was presumptively validated by the electorate. Caperton thus runs
counter to the treatment of democratic self-determination the Court has
so assiduously advanced in the campaign finance context. The holding
deployed a far more restrictive approach to anticorruption than the Court
has permitted to the federal government in other political contexts.
235. 556 U. S. , 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
236. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2262-64. The Court observes, "Following
accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of
judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in
the ordinary course of deciding a case. This does not mean the inquiry is a simple
one . . . . Nothing could be farther from the truth." Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2263
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court further noted, "Much like
determining whether a judge is actually biased, proving what ultimately drives the
electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to lend
itself to a certain conclusion. This is particularly true where, as here, there is no
procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole trier of fact is the one accused of
bias." Id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
237. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept,
123 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2009), criticizes Caperton on related grounds. Observing
that the corrupting influence of money is popularly held to be rife in elected
government and that the justice at hand should have recused himself, Lessig holds
the Court to be acting in a unique - and thus unjustified - manner to protect the
ostensible integrity of the judiciary by suggesting that this particular instance of
financial influence was unacceptable.
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Caperton preserved the deliberative integrity of the judiciary
through a broad-based and subtle assessment of a public servant's
motives. Yet when the government has sought to use anticorruption tools
that make possible the same deliberative inquiries, the Court's decisions
(albeit premised on principles distinct from theories of corruption) have
proven an inflexible barrier. The Court thus implies that the judicial
system must be kept especially free of unacceptable influences in a
manner that other areas of government need not be - indeed, may not
be. If the broader pro-competitive, anti-deliberative arc of the Court's
holdings is treated as a conscious pattern, the implication is that the
Court is protective of the judiciary's unique deliberative role.
VI. ANTICORRUPTION IN THE FUTURE: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND
DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY
The Court's rulings on anticorruption have had an immediate
impact upon black letter law - only competitive laws are left standing.
Yet more significantly, the form of permitted anticorruption regimes
238
shapes the nature of governance. It is this broader impact on political
life that demonstrates the full impact of the competitive-deliberative
divide and ought to be most decisive in guiding future reform.
A. The Practice and Theory ofAnticorruption
Since the specific content of anticorruption law does not depend
on its form as competitive or deliberative, the immediate legal
implications of the Court's competitive allegiance are subtle. The current
state of corruption law requires Congress to narrowly tailor
anticorruption legislation if it is to survive judicial review. This raises
costs for the creation of anticorruption legislation - drafting
convincingly justified laws that target behavior with sharp precision
demands significant institutional effort. The Court's requirement
regarding the form of the law, however, does not itself prevent regulation
238. Much of the discussion of the impact of anticorruption laws has relied on
economic modeling, but it is clear there is a broader impact on political behavior.
See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 52-69 (discussing if and how
anticorruption laws can deter bribery).
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or criminalization of any particular conduct. Yet for certain measures -
regulation of campaign finance expenditures, for example - even
crystalline drafting and forceful articulation of underlying norms might
not overcome the Court's constitutional objections (though such a clear
statement of congressional intent would starkly illustrate the institutional
conflict over the norms of corruption). Such a firm constitutional bar
demonstrates that the competitive effects of the Court's holdings do, at
some point, bleed into substantive positions.29
However, anticorruption enforcement also reflects the political
240
values that underlie a regime. Competitive and deliberative
anticorruption measures promote the qualities of their respective regimes
and shape the behavior of political participants. Deliberative
anticorruption law has the potential to encourage greater public-
mindedness. Conversely, exclusive reliance on competitive laws may
establish a political culture based on self-interest.241 While certainly not
the sole or dominant determinant of political culture, anticorruption law
is both a signpost and a constituent part.
However, deliberative anticorruption enforcement can have
substantial side effects - indeed, these effects have driven the Court's
position. As anticorruption measures become more deliberative - that
is, as they become more flexible, expansive, and discretionary - the
greater the risk they will infringe upon the individual rights of these
figures (and, since donors as well as recipients of bribes are usually
culpable, the private rights of those who attempt to sway political
conduct). Deliberative measures that investigate motive are little more
239. If Congress passed a law explicitly premised in a carefully articulated
view of politics and anticorruption, but that challenged the Court's defense of rights,
it would demonstrate that at some level the Court's holdings evince a certain view of
politics and the relationship between state and individual, at least in the context of
corruption enforcement. This is, again, a difficult theoretical question regarding the
relationship between law and political substance. See supra note 170.
240. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 166-70 (describing the
relationship between corrupt behavior and general political practices, including
enforcement of ethical norms).
241. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 53, at 683-707 (arguing that there should
be greater concern for protecting politicians' time so that they can focus on their
public duties rather than fundraising efforts); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 76, at
1711 (observing that the current (competitive) state of campaign finance produces
leaders who are obsessed with fundraising).
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than vague grants of discretion to enforcement agents; deliberative
measures that seek to preemptively exclude private interest from politics
will inevitably intrude upon legitimate private action. Thus, by exposing
the intentions and deep mental states of individuals to greater state
scrutiny, deliberative anticorruption risks eroding the zone of truly
private action.
Yet this indictment of deliberative anticorruption presumes a
relationship between private and public action affiliated with competitive
democracy. Private and public rights are treated as mutually exclusive
and hydraulic - the expanded public sphere required for deliberative
anticorruption necessarily lessens the extent of private liberty. This
assessment of anticorruption is perfectly compatible with the competitive
assumption that individual participation in politics is oriented around
self-interest. From such a perspective, the basic question in
anticorruption enforcement is balancing the competing goods of
government integrity and private rights.
Deliberative democracy, however, associates good faith political
involvement with the possible enhancement of an individual's private
life. When individuals participate in politics, they gain benefits beyond
242
the private receipt of state-allocated goods. In the most ideal case,
political participation can be transformative, and at a minimum, it should
be somewhat enriching. In this view, assessment of anticorruption
efforts requires a more subtle calculation. Properly tuned, the motive-
transformation that underlies deliberative anticorruption can make
individuals better citizens, as well as prevent leaders from engaging in
self-enrichment. If legitimate, the deliberative, theory of politics
undermines - or at least complicates - many of the objections to the
243
anticorruption measures which have not survived judicial review.
Thus, the desirable future direction of anticorruption policy
depends upon the preferred democratic principles. The types of
anticorruption measures permitted by a polity that conceptualizes of
political obligation as founded in self-interest will differ dramatically
from one that that is founded in democratic discourse and mutual
endeavor.
242. See supra Section I.B.
243. This is also true of the Court's investment in adversarial process,
described in supra Section V.B.
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Of course, theoretical investments must be balanced against
practical concerns. In particular, deliberative anticorruption measures can
lend themselves to abuse by those in power. Because of their breadth,
deliberative anticorruption laws grant more opportunities for
discretionary action; lack of integrity by enforcement agents can thus
make anticorruption itself a vehicle of corruption. This is most direct in
the honest services context, where some claimed the potential for and
reality of prosecutorial abuse.244 Some have argued that restriction of
independent campaign contributions are likewise motivated by corrupt
self-interest: by limiting opportunities for outside communication,
campaign finance restrictions can protect incumbents. 24 5 In light of these
risks, the Court's competitive holdings on anticorruption can be refrained
as protection of individual rights from unscrupulous government action;
a competitive anticorruption regime is necessary to prevent corruption
law itself from being corruptly used. Of course, in terms of achieving
genuine integrity in government, adherence to the competitive approach
poses a paradox: while decreased trust in standing public figures may
make it less prudent to trust them with deliberative anticorruption tools,
deliberative anticorruption is more effective at promoting genuine public
spiritedness. Competitive anticorruption is less liable to abuse, but also
less effective at genuinely transforming the character of public
leadership.
B. Policy Reform: Capitulation, Circumvention, or Coercion
The future direction of federal anticorruption enforcement will
necessarily be shaped by the Court's indirect but forceful establishment
of a competitive anticorruption regime. Because the competitive regime
244. See supra note 175 (describing Scalia's attack on honest services as
giving prosecutors excessive discretion); Beale, supra note 149, at 719 (describing
the potential for political abuse in honest services). See generally Sandra Caron
George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got to Do With It?, 18 GEO. L.J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 740 (2005) (discussing whether prosecutorial discretion aids in
"rein[ing] in public corruption" and hypothesizing whether politics can
appropriately play a role in this context); HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A
DAY: How THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009).
245. See supra note 53 (describing Scalia's argument that campaign finance
restrictions are a form of incumbency protection).
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emerges from protection of constitutionally recognized rights, the costs
of directly rejecting the Court's position and imposing deliberative
measures is high. There are alternatives - either redefining
anticorruption jurisprudence with acceptably competitive measures, or
developing anticorruption strategies that do not infringe upon the Court-
defined rights - but they would struggle to replicate the impact or
cultural effect of deliberative anticorruption achieved by the coercive
power of criminal law and government regulation. The ultimate decision
must advert to substantive political values. A robust deliberative regime
would require either rejecting the Court's prioritization of individual
rights, or redefining politics such that deliberative anticorruption and
individual rights are not at odds.
The path of least resistance for Congress would be to capitulate
to the Court and only pass anticorruption measures in a narrow
competitive mold: criminalize behavior through crisp, bright-line rules,
primarily target offenses that resemble illicit quid pro quo exchanges,
and impose restrictions that do not substantially interfere with individual
rights even among public figures. Explicit self-limitation to such
measures could encourage Congress to more precisely define what types
of behavior it wishes to prohibit. However, given the institutional hurdles
such well-drafted legislation might face, the result might simply be less
anticorruption legislation altogether. Regardless, if the deliberative
approach were abandoned wholesale, anticorruption would no longer be
available to generally shift political culture or encourage broader public-
mindedness. Competitive anticorruption is not suited to seeking such
wide-ranging goals.
Conversely, Congress could challenge the normative and
interpretive legitimacy of the Court's antideliberative holdings. The most
extreme approach would be to seek a constitutional amendment
explicitly granting anticorruption unique standing. The amendment could
indicate that anticorruption efforts should be granted equal weight as
other constitutional concerns, or it could explicitly address particular
anticorruption goals, such as campaign finance and general self-
enrichment by public figures. Alternatively, Congress could apply
oblique institutional pressure, such as attempting to marginalize the
Court by passing legislation that has a popular mandate and clear
deliberative intent. Either approach, however, would cost enormous
political capital. It would pit a less trusted political institution (Congress)
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against one of the more trusted ones (the Court), ironically enough on
the subject of integrity. Furthermore, the attack would, at some level,
insinuate that the Court was working too vigorously to protect individual
rights from government regulation. In the absence of a clear crisis
because of the inadequacy of such regulation, challenging such practice
is politically difficult and normatively suspect.
Finally, Congress could seek the broader goals of deliberative
anticorruption without directly challenging the Court. This would
involve continued reliance on competitive anticorruption measures for
formal enforcement and regulation, but promotion of a broadly
deliberative political culture through measures that do not infringe on
247individual rights. If these measures are successful they would create
more direct accountability for public officials, encourage greater citizen
involvement in government, and strengthen the ties between constituents
and leaders - ultimately creating a political culture in which leaders are
more public-minded and the expectations of the polity are a guiding
influence. However, while these measures might confer benefits, they do
not seem properly classified as anticorruption laws, and it is unclear if
they will have the same efficacy in preventing self-serving conduct by
officials. Deliberative measures without the coercive potential of
criminal or regulatory law are less likely to catch or rectify the conduct
of the most self-aggrandizing politicians - whom are the least likely to
be swayed by softer deliberative programs.
As indicated in the previous section, the appropriate solution will
depend upon foundational political values shaped by practical context. If
the public wishes to achieve a broadly deliberative political culture,
anticorruption laws that serve those values will provide a necessary tool.
However, in the absence of a near-consensus regarding the desirability of
246. See Lydia Said, Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions,
GALLUP, July 22, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/141512/Congress-Ranks-Last-
Confidence-Institutions.aspx; Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor, PEW
CTR., Aug. 18, 2010, http://people-press.org/report/606/trust-in-government.
247. For a list of such proposals - mini-publics, deliberative polling, and so
forth - see supra notes 24-25. Other alternatives could involve intensified
disclosure regimes wedded to efforts to more broadly publicize the results of such
disclosure. However intensive, mandated disclosure itself may raise First
Amendment issues. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 326-27 (1998).
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such a cultural shift, the risks of deliberative anticorruption - as the
Court has indirectly suggested in its jurisprudence - may be excessive.
The accepted forms of anticorruption law may be so intimately tied to
dominant political norms that broadly changing anticorruption policy
without parallel shifts in political culture may be futile. In this respect,
the form of anticorruption law may be more valuable as a bellwether of
broader political values than as an independent target of policy change.
CONCLUSION
The core of this article is a modest descriptive claim: the
Supreme Court's modern holdings in corruption cases have, citing
constitutionally protected individual rights, tended to overturn or
constrain congressional anticorruption laws that are broad or flexible. To
elucidate this analysis, I have deployed a theoretical distinction between
competitive and deliberative anticorruption law, with the Court's
decisions demanding strict adherence to the competitive approach. I have
finally speculated that the Court's indirect imposition of a competitive
anticorruption regime is not merely the serendipitous result of its
treatment of individual rights but reflects deeper, perhaps
constitutionally-inspired, commitments to adversarial procedure and
individual-oriented politics. Thus, the Court's own institutional
tendencies have inclined it toward competitive democratic theory and
thus competitive anticorruption, even if these allegiances have not openly
appeared in the corruption jurisprudence.
These claims are linked and hopefully mutually reinforcing. Yet
they also stand alone, if necessary. The observation there is an
institutional conflict over corruption could be modeled with a rubric
other than competitive/deliberative democracy; or the Court's own
tendencies may ultimately be attributable to forces other than the
constitutional pressures this article has observed. Each of these claims
has distinct significance and this article suggests further investigation of
both institutional action and democratic theory is necessary to make real
progress in the development of a coherent understanding of
anticorruption law.
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